The Need for Comprehensive Liberalism by Goncalves, Eduardo
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107665
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2017
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
The Need for Comprehensive Liberalism
Author: Eduardo Goncalves
The Need for Comprehensive Liberalism 
Eduardo Goncalves, 2nd Lt, USAF 
A thesis 
submitted to the Faculty of  
the department of Philosophy 
in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
Boston College 
Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences 
Graduate School 
December 2017 
This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 
United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.  
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in this thesis are those of the 
author and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of 
Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, the Air 
Force Institute of Technology, or other departments of the US government. 
 
Abstract: The Need for Comprehensive Liberalism
Eduardo Goncalves, 2nd Lt, USAF 
Advisor: Dr. Stephen Hudson, Ph.D 
There has been a growing consensus within political philosophy that liberalism is 
the most rational form of political organization. The arguments in favor of liberalism are 
theoretical and also based on historical observations. The view of liberalism as a moral 
conception of the good life, however, seems to betray its original historical purpose, 
namely, to provide a peaceful political forum despite competing comprehensive 
doctrines. How can liberalism be a thick moral conviction of its own if it was meant to 
temper such zero-sum convictions? To pose this question more concretely: If historic 
wars between strong religious convictions were tempered by provisional liberal 
ceasefires, could we accept the evolution of liberalism into a strong conviction of its 
own? This paradoxical development of liberalism in history runs parallel with 
contemporary philosophical debates. Whether the most proper conception of liberalism is 
comprehensive, and whether it is legitimized upon such comprehensiveness are both 
hotly debated. Exploring these historical and philosophical avenues uncover what I think 
is a need for a conception of comprehensive liberalism. It is beyond my scope here to 
formulate a new conception of liberalism that decisively settles the debate. I do, however, 
point to reasons why comprehensive liberalism should be the focus of contemporary 
efforts. First, I find that history shows a trend of liberalism growing into a positive 
doctrine of its own. Second, I invoke two famous traditional conceptions, one successful 
and one failed, which fuel our baseline intuitions of liberalism with comprehensive, not 
 
political justifications. Finally, I show that while contemporary philosophy surrounding 
liberalism developed a political conception, it cannot avoid slipping towards 
comprehensiveness. Taken together, my argument is that any enforceable and useful 
theory of liberalism must be grounded on thick and comprehensive philosophical 
premises. 
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Introduction 
The nature of political liberalism is consistent, but not everyone, let alone its 
proponents, agree on its character. It is consistent in that it supports freedom with a 
baseline of respect, but who is free or what is respected, and in what way, is not always 
clear. An impetus for liberal thought, even in the contemporary, are clashing doctrines 
and the Wars of Religion that ravished Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. John Rawls 
argues that the biggest obstacle towards peaceful liberalism is when differing 
comprehensive doctrines do not incorporate the demands of reasonability and thus fail to 
compromise with each other. He clarifies the idea of ‘comprehensive doctrines’:  
A conception is fully comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues 
within one rather precisely articulated system […] Many religious and 
philosophical doctrines aspire to be both general and comprehensive.1
Comprehensive doctrines are any sort of thick system of belief. Examples include John 
Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism or Catholic Christianity. An individual’s personal conviction 
or faith in liberalism itself can be a comprehensive doctrine. Comprehensive doctrines 
can be ‘unreasonable’ or ‘uncompromising’ when they deny others the belief in other 
doctrines. History is rife with clashing doctrines. Rawls cites the calamity of the 
Reformation as a prime example of the ‘fact of history,’ that no peaceful political 
conception is possible when based on irreconcilable metaphysical precepts.2 Rawls's 
'political liberalism' wishes to overcome historical woes by differing from this or that 
doctrine. Political liberalism seeks to generate its own support through a political culture 

1  John Rawls, “Introduction,” in Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 13. Hereafter PL.
2 PL, xxii-xxiv, 36. I take ‘the fact of history’ to be synonymous with ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism’.  
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of overlapping consensus and public reasonability, while rejecting unyielding doctrines. 
It can accept the platform of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine in only a neutral or 
disinterested way, and only as long as that doctrine arises from the overlapping consensus 
of reasonable people. It even eschews 'comprehensive liberalism' in which some strong 
doctrine itself supports liberal conceptions. The aim of political liberalism is to achieve 
justice that is permitted to draw support from an overlapping consensus of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, but is not exclusively committed or founded on any one of 
them on a metaphysical level. The fact of history is the source political liberalism's 
aversion to thick justifications. 
 The genius of Rawls's Theory of Justice (TJ) cannot be overstated in its 
contractual and Kantian framework as a response to intuitive problems with utilitarian 
liberalism. While self-supporting and logically founded, Rawls later revised the ideas 
behind his just society to emphasize its political nature. Rawls himself recognized that the 
just liberal society in TJ was a comprehensive, or thick, conception because it touched all 
aspects of human life.3 Rawls's efforts to orient from the broadly metaphysical to the 
political culminated in Political Liberalism (PL). PL specifically avoided invoking or 
establishing comprehensive doctrines, but it did not seek to eliminate them completely as 
they are important in affirming the just liberal society through the overlapping consensus 
of citizens' personal beliefs. In fact, Rawls’s famous “proviso” permits the use of 
comprehensive doctrines in public discourse for the end of giving political reasons.4
Supporters of PL would say that it is not an outright revision of TJ, but a clearer 

3 PL, xxx and 490. 
4 PL, 462. 
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articulation of Rawls’s ideas. PL takes care to introduce new ideas and shift Rawls’s 
focus towards the political, and not metaphysical, conception of liberalism.
Rawls’s shift sparked a spirited philosophical debate between proponents of his 
old and new formulations. On one side are proponents of Rawls’s earlier works, who 
maintain that liberalism is best grounded in comprehensive philosophical suppositions. 
This group sees the two principles of justice as thick moral principles that permeate into 
our intuitions of human flourishing. This group might also argue that Rawls’s ‘new’ 
emphasis on reasonability is simply another strong epistemological demand on people. 
Others in this category such as Joseph Raz might even suggest a re-grounding of 
liberalism on another principle such as autonomy. On the other side are proponents of 
Rawls’s later works, remaining loyal to his shift. They are broadly categorized as those 
who think that political liberalism was Rawls’s intention even since TJ, which has been 
corrupted by comprehensive readings. Its champions such as Jonathan Quong turn the 
liberal focus away from comprehensiveness, as Rawls intended, with new ideas such as 
‘public morality’ and ‘internal conception’. This is, of course, an oversimplification, but I 
think it is valuable in terms of offering a preliminary grasp of the debate as a whole. My 
overarching objective in this paper is to argue somewhat in favor of the comprehensive 
side.
Very simply, I think that a look at history, traditional liberal philosophy, Rawls’s 
language, and the contemporary debate will reveal evidence that orients political 
philosophy towards comprehensive liberalism, and not political liberalism. In Chapter 1, I 
invoke Isaiah Berlin’s positive and negative liberty as a tool to identify how liberalism is 
shifting from the ceasefire of Westphalia to the comprehensiveness of international 
 Ͷ
responsibilities. In Chapter 2, I outline Augustinian justice as an example of a failed 
liberalism, reinforcing the warning of the fact of history against comprehensiveness. In 
Chapter 3, I bring forward Locke’s liberalism to show that it is possible (in contrast with 
Augustine) to have a reasonably successful liberalism that is grounded on comprehensive 
precepts. Chapter 4 reviews striking comprehensive elements of Rawls’s later work, 
despite his insisted shift towards political liberalism. Finally, Chapter 5 follows two 
giants, Raz and Quong, in the contemporary debate and affirms my intuition in favor of 
the comprehensive path for liberalism. 
 ͷ
Chapter 1 - The Historical Trend of Liberalism: From Modus Vivendi to 
Comprehensive
A careful look at history since the middle ages shows liberalism as something like 
a confusing two-faced creature. It justifies one political status quo one year, only to 
reverse it in another. It can apply to an individual's relationship with government, or the 
world's relationship with itself. International liberalism today looks different than it did 
over 300 years ago if one takes its birth to be the Treaty of Westphalia. My aim in this 
chapter is to gain some footing as to political liberalism's historical development through 
the contemporary philosophical lens. A historical analysis will demonstrate a trend 
towards positive liberalism, which will pave the way towards a more comprehensive 
outlook on liberalism. My perspective is narrowed by not only an international lens, but 
also by Isaiah Berlin's categorization of negative and positive liberty. First, I will provide 
a classical Westphalian overview of negative liberalism and why it came about. Next, I 
will specify exactly what I mean by parsing liberalism into negative and positive parts. 
After, I will show how the character of political liberalism has shifted away from 
Westphalian norms to a more interventionist, positive conception. Then, I will show how 
the historical shift of liberalism is analogous to its theoretical shift in Rawls's The Law of 
Peoples. Finally, I will sketch out an approach to answering whether or not this shift is 
justified with respect to liberalism itself or to moral philosophy. Liberalism has made a 
historical shift starting from a negative, Westphalian system to a morally thick, positive 
conception; this historical shift runs parallel with a philosophical shift exemplified by 
Rawls's The Law of Peoples.
 ͸
1.1 The Westphalian System
The Protestant Reformation and ensuing Wars of Religion plunged Europe into 
catastrophe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Religion and empire made politics a zero sum 
free-for-all in which the good of one religion did not allow room for any other. According 
to Rawls,
[. . .] the great evils of human history – unjust war and oppression, religious 
persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to 
mention genocide and mass murder – follow from political injustice, with its own 
cruelties and callousness.”5
Justice was anything done in the name of religious salvation. Worldly atrocities were 
secondary to the salvation of souls. An example of these atrocities includes the St. 
Bartholomew's Day massacre of Huguenots, which Pope Pius V held a mass of 
thanksgiving for in 1572.6 While this specifically illustrates the overall historic attitude of 
Catholicism at the time, it does not mean the new Protestant competitor was innocent. 
Rawls affirms how each side repressed the slightest dissent: “The Reformation had 
enormous consequences. [. . .] Luther and Calvin were as dogmatic and intolerant as the 
Roman Church had been.”7 Inflexible religious beliefs fueled the fire to include the 
political circumstances. The political makeup of states at this time were supported by 
singular ideologies, and therefore they were not conducive to peace. Rawls continues: 
England, France, Spain, Hapsburg Austria, Sweden, and others fought dynastic 
wars for territory, true religion, for power and glory, and a place in the sun. These 

5 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 7. Hereafter LP.
6 LP, 21. 
7 PL, xxiii. 
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were wars of Monarchs and Royal Houses; the internal institutional structure of 
these societies made them inherently aggressive and hostile to other states.8
The internal composition of states reflected views that were not merely comprehensive, 
but were actively vindictive and exclusionary towards dissent. Such a hostility of states 
and ideas made peace and society impossible.  
 While just war theory had already been developed by medieval thinkers, it had not 
satisfied conditions of religious or political tolerance. This reinforces the notion that 
justice at the time was heavily dependent on whether a person was a believer or a heretic. 
Early Christian thinkers such as Tertullian took a heavily pacifist stance, but this was not 
the dominant view. St. Augustine of Hippo was the first to move away from pacifism. He 
recognizes that warfare specifically conducted under the authority of God, either 
transitively or directly, is justified.9 He makes it clear that such war is permissible if in 
the name of peace. That, however, is only truly fulfilled by like-minded believers. The 
wrong peace could be disturbed to be replaced with the right one. Augustine decries 
peace with non-believers:  
It comes to this, then; a man who has learnt to prefer right to wrong and the 
rightly ordered to the perverted, sees that the peace of the unjust, compared with 
the peace of the just, is not worthy even of the name of peace.10
Augustine's Christian development from pacifism to just war might negate some 
atrocities in the Wars of Religion, but it does not negate the overall conflict as a whole. 

8 LP, 8. 
9 Larry May et al, The Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New Jersey: Pearson 
Education, Inc., 2006), 1-4. 
10 Augustine of Hippo, The City of God in The Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings,
ed. by Larry May et al, (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006), Book XIX, Ch. 12. 
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St. Thomas Aquinas is also widely considered to be the father of just war theory, but his 
theory is similarly grounded on religious belief. His principles of authority, just cause, 
right intention, defense and proportionality surely accord with justice broadly conceived, 
but religion is still a priority. Wars must be conducted peacefully, but they can be 
initiated against “the evil peace” or sinners against the common good.11 It is clear that 
Christian just war thought up to the Wars of Religion granted exceptions when it came to 
non-believers. Larry May et al agree that in the medieval Christian view, war is “justified 
if it is waged to convert infidels, since the infidels harm self and others.”12 The overall 
calamity of the Wars of Religion was not considered wrong at the time. Rather, both 
Protestants and Catholics considered it in accord with justice espoused by medieval 
thought. Comprehensive religion was justice during this period, resulting in a political 
landscape were conflict was incessant. The carnage did not make such a political 
framework sustainable. 
 The answer to this turbulent period was liberalism. Perhaps more accurately 
speaking, the political evolutionary result was interstate religious pluralism, which was 
the seed of a thin conception of liberalism. These conflicts closed with the Westphalian 
system, based on the Peace of Westphalia in 1684. It decisively affirmed the principle 
from the Peace of Augsburg (1555) of cujus regio ejus religio, meaning the state is given 
the right to determine the religion of its subjects, with some guarantees given to certain 
religious groups.13  This set a precedent for international norms ever since. While 

11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica in The Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings,
ed. by Larry May et al, (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006), Q.40, A.1, Q.44, A.6. 
12 Morality of War, 3. 
13 Allen Buchanan, “Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World” in Ethics 110, no. 
4 (July 2000), 703. 
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significant in the history of politics, the Westphalian system is probably the most 
significant historical development to affect political philosophy, planting the seed for 
pluralism in general.14 Rawls thinks the result of the Wars of Religion is so monumental 
that it points to four basic political facts “confirmed by reflecting on history and political 
experience.”15 One of these facts is that of Reasonable Pluralism. He explains: “Religious 
division was seen as a disaster for civil polity. It took the experience of actual history to 
show this view to be false.”16 Another one is the Fact of Public Reason: 
This is the fact that citizens in a pluralist liberal democratic society realize that 
they cannot reach agreement, or even approach mutual understanding, on the basis 
of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. 
The Westphalian system showed that competing doctrines can not only coexist but also 
function if pluralism is accepted on at least a practically political level. This newfound 
political liberalism was difficult to accept even at its minimal interstate infancy. Rawls 
notes: “Even the earlier proponents of toleration saw the division of Christendom as a 
disaster, though a disaster that had to be accepted in view of the alternative of unending 
religious civil war.”17 Even the most tolerant Christians of the time could not stand to see 
their comprehensive views so compromised, but the Westphalian system was 
begrudgingly accepted by both sides as the only alternative. As unbearable as it was, 
international liberalism was the only surefire political idea to survive both sides. Indeed, 
it has survived to the present day.

14 PL, 12. 
15 LP, 124. 
16 Ibid. 
17 PL, xxiv. 
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1.2 From Negative to Positive Liberty 
Many divisions, some more appropriate than others, were made to help parse the 
conflicting meanings of liberty: Ancient vs Modern, Positive vs Negative, Realist vs 
Liberal, Political vs Comprehensive, Totalizing vs Communicative, to include a few. 
There are other helpful terms such as minimal (Nozick), political (late Rawls), 
comprehensive (early Rawls), and perfectionist (Raz) which can serve as guides within 
the contemporary debate. For the sake of the historical analysis in this chapter, I stick 
with Isaiah Berlin’s positive and negative liberty. To be clear, I do not see positive and 
negative liberty as wholly separate political conceptions, but rather two perspectives from 
which we can understand liberalism. The liberalism that grew from the Treaty of 
Westphalia invokes a negative conception of liberty. Berlin defines negative freedom as 
“the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to 
do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons.”18 The ideas 
of classical libertarians such as Locke, Mill, Adam Smith, Constant, and Tocqueville help 
paint a picture of negative liberty. Government interference is justified only insofar as 
protecting the freedom of individuals, but even so it is minimal as human nature is 
viewed with optimism. This concept of freedom is modern and hardly exists in the 
ancient world. Berlin highlights this: 
The sense of privacy itself, of the area of personal relationships as something 
sacred in its own right, derives from a conception of freedom which, for all its 

18 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Readings in Social and Political Philosophy, ed. by Robert 
M. Stewart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90. 
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religious roots, is scarcely older, in its developed state, than the Renaissance or 
the Reformation.19
While the Treaty of Westphalia was not respectful to all individuals, it was the first step 
in the liberal direction. It was a founding impulse of negative liberty in which subjective 
goals (albeit those of bishops, kings, and specific peoples) were given political respect 
and noninterference. The actual enumerated rights of the individual are not consistent 
among theorists of negative liberty, but it does emphasize plurality in that the individual 
can pursue what they think is best.
 Berlin defines positive freedom, on the other hand, to be “the source of control or 
interference, that can determine someone to do, or be, one thing rather than another.”20
Humans are granted expanded possibilities or higher potentials under this notion. 
Comparatively speaking, Berlin asserts that positive freedom is “not freedom from, but 
freedom to [. . .] the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.”21
Individuals are granted a mastery over their destiny. They are an empty shell with a lost 
purpose without this freedom. Berlin points to some examples of positive freedom:  
The Marxist conception of social laws is, of course, the best known version of this 
theory, but it forms a large element in some Christian and utilitarian, and all 
socialist, doctrines.22
It is easy to see how Communist or some Christian views of liberty would be considered 
positive, since they are both assertive doctrines. Under such a positive conception, people 
would agree on what they want: “What, at most, this entails is that they would not resist 

19 Ibid., 93. 
20 Ibid., 90. 
21 Ibid., 93-4. 
22 Ibid., 95. 
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me if they were rational, and as wise as I, and understood their interests as I do.”23
Positive liberty encompasses what a rational person should want to be. I should stress that 
while a system of morality such as utilitarianism is tied to negative liberty through Mill, 
even the most negatively liberal political conceptions could slip into the realm of positive 
liberty. This notion of liberty carries the implication that the 'real' wishes of people can be 
given to them, but this does not seem to be in line with the Westphalian system. Like 
Berlin, I consider the Westphalian system to be an example of assuring liberalism in the 
specifically negative sense. 
1.3 The Growing Trend of Positive Liberalism from the Responsibility to Protect 
The character of liberalism has been shifting away from what was born of 
Westphalia. Contemporary international institutions such as the United Nations affirm the 
rights of different states, but that precedent is changing. The impetus now is respect for 
states as long as they meet certain conditions. The traditional Westphalian system has 
undergone some shakeups, but it has stood firm. Historical elements such as Napoleon, 
the anti-revolutionary stance of the Congress of Vienna, and also the League of Nations 
after WWI failed at dislodging the Westphalian system. The lessons learned from WWII 
and the ensuing Cold War came close, but they too did not remove it. The end of the Cold 
War was also considered a triumph of the liberal world order, but it was not decisive in 
replacing the Westphalian principles that fathered it. The norms of sovereignty and 
respect are just as much ideas of Westphalia as are liberalism and pluralism. The 
international Westphalian system stands its ground, but new political circumstances 

23 Ibid., 94-5. 
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suggest an organic feature of liberalism. The global political norm maintains Westphalian 
liberalism, but recent events suggest its evolution towards something more positive.  
 I wish to clarify that I do not make any serious philosophical judgment as to 
historical interventions for liberal ends. There is no question that innumerable 
interventions since 1684 were conducted 'in the defense of freedom'. The actual 
philosophical justification of interventions with regard to political liberalism is beyond 
the scope here. To what extent they were warranted, successful, or faithful to liberalism is 
not my concern. I only raise this topic to demonstrate how contemporary conceptions of 
liberalism in historical political practice seem to be shifting away from that of a negative 
Westphalian type to a more positive type. Whether interventions are true to liberalism or 
not I leave an open question. Again, my focus is to analogize the historical trend of 
liberalism with its philosophical issues, not necessarily to advocate for those 
developments.  
 The growing norm of responsibility to protect (R2P) is a prime example of how 
liberal ideals are invoked and positively enforced rather than merely defended or 
protected. There are certainly some other examples of liberalism that have been 
positively promulgated beyond the borders of liberal states. Some of these include 
Rwanda, Libya, or Afghanistan and the Gulf Wars. Even during the Cold War, actions 
taken in 'defense' against Communism were considered to be an intervention of domestic 
affairs in the name of liberalism.24 John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address in 1961 reflected 
a liberalism's positive attitude towards Communism: “Let every nation know, whether it 
wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, 

24  This is a contentious statement. I would anticipate objections along the lines of Noam Chomsky’s work. 
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support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”25 It 
seems that Kennedy's promise carries a sense of vindictive liberalism, if not at the very 
least defensive against other doctrines. Placing the Cold War aside, global intervention in 
Bosnia in the early 1990s is probably the best example of unilateral action in the name of 
philosophical liberal principles, even if human rights are also fundamental to other 
theories.26 The Serbian genocide was unilaterally condemned by the UN, prompting 
unified efforts of aid and protection to the Muslim enclaves. Although in agreement, the 
UN's efforts were lackluster, prompting direct and expedited military action from NATO. 
Bill Clinton's address to troops in Macedonia in 1999 echoes Kennedy:  
But never forget, if we can do this here, and if we can then say to the people of 
the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if 
somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because 
of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it's within our power to 
stop it, we will stop it.27
Clinton reflects the growing liberal political disposition against humanitarian violations, 
and the willingness to stop them across Westphalian boundaries. Intervention of this sort 
could be triggered by any country, not just Bosnia. If this is the case, liberalism is being 
enforced across boundaries, giving it the authoritative weight of positive liberty rather 
than the passivity or mere protection of negative liberty. This example of R2P is also an 
instance of liberalism being used as a casus belli to violate sovereignty.

25 “Inaugural Address of John F. Kennedy, January 20, 1961” in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
and Museum. Accessed 8 May 2017. 
26 Kendall W. Stiles, “Intervention: Bosnia” in Case Histories in International Politics (New Jersey: 
Pearson Education, Inc., 2013), 92-113. 
27 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President to the KFOR Troops” (June 22, 
1999, Skopje, Macedonia) in Case Histories in International Politics (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 
Inc., 2013), 93. 
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1.4 Positive Liberalism in Political Philosophy 
 Interventions with liberal ends are becoming an increasingly common norm of the 
liberal world order, a trend which is reflected in liberal theory. Rawls's LP opened his 
theory of justice and political liberalism to the international scope. While his system 
reinforces some elements of Westphalian liberalism, such as respect for comparable 
states, it stunningly does away with sovereignty altogether. Under non-ideal theory, 
Rawls responds to the sheer reality of the international stage through his principles. One 
of the non-utopic concessions that he makes is towards “decent societies” which are not 
strictly liberal in their absolute fulfillment of the two principles of justice, but they do 
fulfill critical liberal criterion such as pluralism, respect, peacefulness, rationality, or 
provisional justice.28 Rawls's treatment of decent peoples falls in line with negative 
Westphalian liberal intentions. His overall vision, however, completely redraws what 
sovereignty and rights mean for states.29 Rawls specifically differentiates his international 
liberalism “from that about political states as traditionally conceived, with their powers of 
sovereignty included in the (positive) international law for the three centuries after the 
Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).”30 Rawls’s shift away from the Treaty of Westphalia 
could not be more blunt: “From my perspective this autonomy is wrong.”31 Citing WWII 
as a turning point in international law, state autonomy is restricted in his system, with the 
prime moral agent being shifted onto people, or a peoples.

28 LP, §8.2, §9.3. 




Rawls's response to “outlaw states” and “burdened societies” invoke rational or 
moral duties which depart a Westphalian system and embody positive liberalism.32
Outlaw states threaten the stability of institutions and system of well-ordered peoples, 
and in extreme or particularly evil circumstances, their very existence. Outlaw states that 
violate human rights are “to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to 
forceful sanctions and even to intervention.”33 Extreme humanitarian crises justify 
military intervention even if no formal expansion has occurred on the part of the outlaw 
state. Economic aid or consistent political pressure are also permissible forms of 
intervention on burdened societies. Rawls makes a positive conviction of liberalism's 
imperatives: “The long-term goal of (relatively) well-ordered societies should be to bring 
burdened societies, like outlaw states, into the Society of well-ordered Peoples. Well-
ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies.”34 This is evidence that the 
world order's goal is as positive as can be, to help elevate non-well-ordered peoples into 
the liberal fold. Rawls's move away from traditional, Westphalian conceptions of liberty 
is an excellent analogy of a historical political trend. 
1.5 Negative to Positive Liberalism Marks the Paradox of Liberalism 
While political liberalism sprouted from the Peace of Westphalia, there seems to 
be a paradox just as Berlin described. The greater puzzle is that positive liberalism is 
being used in violation of negative Westphalian liberalism. If positive and negative 
liberty were considered two perspectives of viewing the same political philosophical 
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system of liberalism, it could be said that liberalism was cannibalizing itself. This is not a 
novel observation. There is a challenging debate surrounding this paradox best 
exemplified by Jonathan Quong's rejection of Joseph Raz's perfectionist liberalism. 
Unpackaging this paradox and even asserting what 'intensity' of liberalism is justified 
requires grounding these terms in the theoretical debate. Challenges here include those of 
scope (domestic or international), the cogency of using Berlin's division of liberty, and 
consistency of terms across similar but not identical theories. I table these concerns for 
another time. The main point in this chapter is that Rawls’s fact of history might support 
liberalism in general, but a second look at historical trends show an increasing 
comprehensiveness behind liberalism in practice. Later, we will see that this trend 
parallels a currently unresolved debate. Moving forward for now, a look at two origins of 
theoretical liberalism suggest that it originally operated on singular comprehensive 
doctrines. A philosophical look at significant conceptions of liberalism show that it 
traditionally had a comprehensive character to it. 
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Chapter 2 - Augustinian Justice and the Problem of Comprehensive Liberalism 
No understanding of justice, from practical to metaphysical, would be complete if 
it lacked St. Augustine of Hippo’s treatment of it. If Augustine’s thoughts are a major 
pillar of medieval philosophical thought, his treatment of justice demands our attention, 
especially with regards to the investigation of comprehensive liberalism. Book XIX of 
The City of God gives insight to the relevance of earthly, political justice in the human 
search for the ultimate good. My primary aim in this chapter is to review Augustine’s 
conception of justice with focus on Book XIX. I am also interested in the political 
implications behind Augustinian justice, and whether he thinks political justice could be 
called ‘justice’ at all. Simply put, Augustine’s conception of justice is that of a divine 
virtue or quality which makes possible the proper and natural order, and consequently, 
peace. Corporeal and temporal examples of natural ordering or political peace are all 
reflections of an eternal perfect justice. The source or condition of justice is God’s 
essential, simple, good, existing, and unified being. Other sources or types of justice 
cannot properly be so. Different faiths do not provide a correct conception in their 
confusion, and neither can the errors or vanity of human understanding alone. I agree 
with some that a surface reading of Augustinian justice would imply an incompatibility 
with political philosophical concerns of respecting reasonable plurality. I do argue, 
however, that such a reading results in various misconceptions that do not genuinely 
reflect Augustine’s thought. These misconceptions have unfortunately been used to 
implement political action throughout history that Augustinian justice, properly 
considered, would not permit. Augustine’s justice is the philosophical foundation for any 
liberalism on earth that he would accept. It supports a comprehensive form of liberalism, 
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but it also outlines the challenge that a contemporary conception must overcome. Taken 
broadly, Augustinian thought as an example of comprehensive liberalism offers a 
warning to contemporary thinkers. 
 There is a difficulty in reviewing what Augustine means by justice because he 
mostly discusses it in a negative way. The objective of The City of God as a whole is to 
demonstrate that the supreme good for any human is not found in any earthly aspect 
alone, but instead from, through, and in God. His approach in Book XIX specifically in 
finding justice is by knocking down every potential candidate before arriving at the only 
positive source, i.e. God. My approach to reviewing Augustine’s understanding of justice 
is two pronged. First, I will lay down what his positive definition of justice is up front. 
Afterwards I will describe Augustine’s negative definitions, which comprise the bulk of 
this Book. Before reviewing the negative definition, Augustine’s positive answer to the 
question ‘What is justice?’ is ‘Exactly what any good is: God.’ 
2.1 Augustine’s Conception of Justice: God’s Supreme Order and Peace 
Augustinian justice stems from God and the good, making peace possible, and 
orienting everything to its proper place. Augustine discusses justice positively in many 
instances within the context of God, order, and peace. There are two helpful instances, in 
Chapters 21 and 23, where he speaks of justice broadly. The first is when he refutes 
justice as virtue without God in Scipio’s commonwealth: 
Justice is the virtue which accords to each and every man what is his due. What, 
then, shall we say of a man’s ‘justice’ when he takes himself away from the true 
God and hands himself over to dirty demons? Is this a giving to each what is his 
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due? If a man who takes away a farm from its purchaser and delivers it to another 
man who has no claim upon it is unjust, how can a man who removes himself 
from the overlordship of the God who made him and goes into the service of 
wicked spirits be just?35
True justice involves giving what is due to God plainly enough. Here he uses a common-
sense example of land ownership as an analogy. Stripping anyone of what is rightfully 
theirs cannot be justice. When it comes to God, everything is rightfully his and is due to 
him as the Creator. Augustine searches for justice beyond Cicero, into every corner he 
could be expected to know, but cannot find it save as the proper order granted by God. 
Having exhausted other options, he most clearly enumerates what justice must be when 
rejecting Porphyry:
To sum up. Where justice is wanting, in the sense that the civil community does 
not take its orders from the one supreme God, and follow them out with the help 
of His grace; where sacrifice is offered to any save Him alone; where, 
consequently, the civil community is not such that everyone obeys God in this 
respect; where the soul does not control the body, and reason our evil urges, as 
proper order and faith require; where neither the individuals nor the whole 
community, ‘the people,’ live by that faith of the just which works through the 
charity which loves God as He should be loved and one’s neighbor as oneself 
[…]36
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Augustine’s reply to Porphyry gives a negative definition for justice so simply that the 
positive connotation is obvious. Faith in God confides in Him his order and what is due 
to him. All things are necessarily only possible through God, with justice being another 
quality helping orient everything back to Him. The unity of small orders is the proper 
order of everything which falls under God. There is a difficulty in discussing justice 
positively as there is in discussing anything holy. Augustine was strategic in focusing 
Book XIX on negative definitions. There is, however, a positive pattern between justice, 
God, order, and peace that Ernest Fortin clarifies: 
Justice in the highest sense prescribes the right ordering of all things according to 
reason. […] It exists when the body is ruled by the soul, when the lower appetites 
are ruled by reason, and when reason itself is ruled by God. The same hierarchy is 
or should be observed in society as a whole and is encountered when virtuous 
subjects obey wise rulers, whose minds are in turn subject to the divine law.37
Fortin affirms that there are three critical relations that Augustine makes when discussing 
justice. The first is that justice exists in the universe from, through, and towards God as 
the supreme good. The second is that it pulls everything towards an order decreed by 
eternal law, which could be best seen through the natural and revealed order of things. 
The third and final relation justice has is that it serves as a precondition for peace when it 
is fulfilled in the proper order. Exploring the relations between justice and God, order, 
and peace will clarify Augustine’s overarching view. 
 Augustine makes it clear that the initial source of justice is God. Justice is related 
to the good when it comes to setting the good order, and the ultimate good must be God 
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from Whom everything is. Augustine explains that in the search for the good, the 
Christian would say that it is eternal life granted from God: 
If I am asked what stand the City of God would take on the issues raised […], the 
answer would be: She holds that eternal life is the supreme good and eternal death 
the supreme evil, and that we should live rightly in order to obtain the one and 
avoid the other.38
It is certain that if God is the source of all good, surely He would be the source of justice. 
Knowledge of attaining any good is received from God via all our faculties of judgement, 
and indeed only through Him is it possible. Justice is not ‘distributive justice’, ‘karmic 
justice’, or ‘court justice’, but ‘His justice’. Augustine says that God justly resists those 
who might seek it through the lens of their vanity: 
Who, then, save a proud man, will presume that he can live without needing to 
ask God: ‘Forgive us our debts’? […] – one whom God in His justice resists while 
He grants His grace to the humble. Hence it is written: ‘God resists the proud, but 
gives grace to the humble.’39
Justice can only be given by God to those that are humble and confide in him. Augustine 
poses the question plainly: “what fragment of justice can there be in a man who is not 
subject to God […]? And if there is no justice in a man of this kind, then there is certainly 
no justice, either, in an assembly made up of such men.”40 This drives his point home. 
When searching for justice, one need not look farther than the source of all good, God. 
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 Augustine also relates justice closely with the proper order of reality. This 
ubiquitous connection is that where there is order, there is justice, and vice versa. Justice 
is ordering that to which is due. The order of God is to say the order of reality, which 
includes all possible subdivided orders. That being the case, true justice is when that 
overall order is satisfied, but there can be reflections of divine Justice in the justice of 
particular orders. Those who are miserable without order (and thus peace) are 
experiencing a lack of justice returning them towards equilibrium: 
Order is an arrangement of like and unlike things whereby each of them is 
disposed in its proper place. This being so, those who are unhappy, in so far as 
they are unhappy, are not in peace, since they lack the calm of that Order which is 
beyond every storm; nevertheless, even in their misery they cannot escape from 
order, since their very misery is related to responsibility and to justice.41
The objective of justice is in the correct ordering of things. Even in chaos justice will 
naturally operate in bringing things towards order. Augustine explains the relationship 
between justice and order in refutation of the classical virtue conception. Someone 
looking for the ultimate good may turn to Aristotelian ethics as a guide, but Augustine 
thinks this path is fruitless without the right end in mind.  
Its task is to see that to each is given what belongs to each. And this holds for the 
right order within man himself, so that it is just for the soul to be subordinate to 
God, and the body to the soul, and thus for body and soul taken together to be 
subject to God.42
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The correct order of the individual may have justice in part, but justice must involve the 
order of man under God in order to reach completeness. Paths of mere virtue or mere 
faith do not satisfy the multiple orders of order. Augustine continues by explaining how 
the justice of the right order is natural. The justice of God’s order is not artificial and 
contrarian; rather justice is the order (and consequent peace) of what it is for things to be 
what they are: 
[…] to be organic means to be ordered and, therefore, to be, in some sense, at 
peace. […] there can be no nature completely devoid of good. Even the nature of 
the Devil, in so far as it is a nature, is not evil; it was perversity […]43
What this means is that everything, including the Devil as existing, naturally move 
towards the proper order via the gravity of God’s justice. Justice is tied with the correct 
orders of things as they were naturally meant to be with respect to the overarching Order. 
 The result of correct, natural order as justice is peace. Imitations of peace can be 
found in different orders, but true peace can only come about from the supreme order laid 
out by God’s eternal law. Augustine elaborates more on the eternal order in Book XX, 
but he touches on it in Book XIX while discussing peace: 
Peace between a mortal man and his Maker consists in ordered obedience guided 
by faith, under God’s eternal law; […] The peace of the heavenly City lies in a 
perfectly ordered and harmonious communion of those who find their joy in God 
and in one another in God. Peace, in its final sense, is the calm that comes of 
order.44
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The best or final kind of peace, from order, inevitably rises from justice. There are 
semblances or shadows of the eternal order when looking at lesser orders, but these lesser 
orders could barely be called such in comparison with the true Order. Augustine agrees 
that peace, while not by itself the highest good, is an aspect of the highest good that all 
people yearn for. Peace is the result of order, and so transitively justice is the 
precondition for it. Augustine explains:
Instead of nullifying or tearing down, she [the heavenly City] preserves and 
appropriates whatever in the diversities of divers races is aimed at one and the 
same objective of human peace, provided only that they do not stand in the way of 
the faith and worship of the one supreme and true God. […] Of course, though, 
the City of God subordinates this earthly peace to that of heaven.45
Human diversity is not an obstacle when seeking peace. The main concern is whether 
humanity can live in accordance with the just order. Peace of the particulars is 
insufficient and not truly just. God’s justice is not its flawed mimic in the peace of the 
city. Peace comes from justice, but only the most wholesome justice can secure the most 
wholesome peace. True peace is not achieved by the shadow of justice, but by God’s 
Justice. Having reviewed the positive definition of Augustinian justice, I turn to 
Augustine’s preferred method in Book XIX of negative definition. 
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2.2 External, Internal, and Interpersonal ‘Gods’: Pitfalls and Confusions on the Path to 
Augustinian Justice 
According to Augustine, all earthly matters alone cannot help anyone achieve the 
supreme good. God must be at the forefront of any such endeavor for it to be possible. If 
justice is to be considered an aspect of goodness, the same argument applies. There are 
various instances where Augustine applies the standard logic of finding the supreme good 
with finding justice. God cannot be found in individual things that are not God. Justice 
cannot be found save as divine either. As with finding the supreme good, Augustine is 
clear in his negative arguments in the search for justice. Augustine’s negative arguments 
for justice can be divided into three types. Justice cannot be found in other Gods or 
religions, lone personal logic or feeling, nor in social or intersubjective spheres. 
Experience, logic, and faith may point towards God and true Justice, but by themselves 
they are not the measures of justice. 
For one, justice cannot from competing faiths. Augustine is clear that when reason 
and revelation grant us the one true God, other ‘gods’ cannot be in the picture. Justice 
does not come from gods which are contingent, fallible, corporeal, or otherwise limited in 
any way. Augustine’s rejection of Roman gods was the entire point of Part I of The City 
of God, but he reiterates the Book XIX: 
The city of this world […] has had certain ‘wise men’ of its own mold, whom true 
religion must reject, because either out of their own day-dreaming or out of 
demonic deception these wise men came to believe that a multiplicity of divinities 
was allied with human life […]46
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From here Augustine lists the sad absurdity of the various types of gods that are modeled 
after every which part of practical human life on earth. A god for a part of the body and 
another for wine cannot be gods, nor can any number of them be God. The worship of 
other gods is antithetical to God’s order in terms of faith and reason. It follows that 
without the correct order, there cannot be justice: 
The fact is that any civil community made up of pagans who are disobedient to 
God’s command that He alone receive sacrifices and who, therefore, are devoid of 
the rational and religious control of soul over body and of reason over sinful 
appetite must be lacking in true justice.47
True justice cannot exist when there is discord in the parts of the order, and much less 
when there is discord on the order of the whole. Augustin is clear that God’s justice 
cannot be without him. Any sort of paganism is antithetical to justice, and so too is 
pantheism. Worshipping mere nature, cosmos, fate, chance, or any other phenomenon is 
just as clever a deception as worshipping other gods.48 Worshipping something false 
causes the search for the good to fall apart. Nothing is possible from accidents and 
untruths; from God on the contrary everything is possible, especially justice. 
 Purely philosophical answers to the question of justice on the personal level are 
insufficient. Aquinas questions the immense number of philosophical candidates for the 
supreme good. He systematically reviews permutations of thought and opinions “in this 
world of shadows”, from the classical Greek to the popular new skepticism of his time.49
By the end of his survey, Augustine highlights the absurdity of Marcus Varro’s 288 
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possibilities50 that philosophy alone could answer with. The answer to justice must be 
more than naked systems of virtues, social theory, hedonism, or contemplation. Justice is 
not concerned with what is true and natural, not accidents: 
[…] when philosophers become Christians, the Church does not force them to 
give up their distinctive attire or mode of life which are no obstacle to religion, 
but only their erroneous teachings.51
Leading an incomplete personal life that does not accord with the fact of things is an 
injustice. The life of pure philosophy might offer clues, but with no belief in the true God 
it is not an avenue for justice.  
The practical limits of humanity on any interpersonal level serve as a barrier 
towards justice. Augustine deliberates how any type of mere interpersonal or political 
relationships a person can have is imperfect and doomed to fail. He mirror’s Aristotle’s 
political thought to show how justice cannot be found in any human interaction without 
God: “All human relationships are fraught with such misunderstandings. Not even the 
pure-hearted affection of friends is free from them. […] who can rely utterly even on 
family affection?”52 A catalog of various human interactions will not find the source of 
all being in them. Relying on a human for justice is a fool’s errand. The simple death of a 
loved one is all it takes to show that eternal life is not in another human. Neither could 
the erroneous city be the true source of justice. Augustine argues that the state cannot 
possibly have the knowledge and power to preserve the right order of things. Human 
ignorance in a trial confronts us with our limits: “Thus it often happens that the ignorance 
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of the judge turns into tragedy for the innocent party.”53 After the city, Augustine turns to 
the calamity of the global sphere. Differing cultures and languages present obstacles to 
mutual understanding. He laments the wars that are only as various as they are ceaseless. 
No doubt he had in mind the apocalyptic clashes of his time amongst Romans, Goths, 
Huns, and Sassanids. Injustice is found even in so-called ‘just’ wars:
I know the objection that a good ruler will wage wars only if they are just. But, 
surely, if he will only remember that he is a man, he will begin by bewailing the 
necessity he is under of waging even just wars.54
Humans wage war for peace, but no peace is possible without God and His justice.  
2.3 Augustinian Justice, Respecting Reasonable Competing Doctrines, and 
Misconceptions
A contemporary political reading of Augustine might raise serious objections to 
his conception of justice. Is plurality possible with divine justice? What should be done 
with competing false doctrines that espouse injustice? A modern would have good 
reasons for criticizing Augustine’s framework as a comprehensive doctrine (or a piece of 
totalizing knowledge) that will not compromise with other doctrines. When discussing 
war and peace, Augustine makes a sinister comment:  
Anyone, then, who is rational enough to prefer right to wrong and order to 
disorder can see that the kind of peace that is based on injustice, as compared with 
that which is based on justice, does not deserve the name of peace.55
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A modern may see this as Augustine giving license for intolerance towards anyone who 
does not recognize God’s justice. The contemporary liberal theorist might take such 
examples as evidence that Augustine’s justice runs in the face of the fact of history: that 
such uncompromising doctrines inevitably lead to abhorrent conflicts like the Wars of 
Religion during the Reformation.56 The modern would agree to the interpretation that 
Augustine appealed to the state to repress competing doctrines, and he accepted drastic 
measures and force on a political level in the name of Christianity. Fortin elaborates on 
this contention with commentary on Augustine’s reaction to the Donatist heresy and its 
historical impact: 
Unfortunately his action established a precedent whose consequences far 
exceeded anything that he himself appears to have foreseen. What was for him, a 
mere concession to necessity or at most an emergency measure designed to cope 
with a specific situation was later invoked as a general principle to justify the 
church’s reprisals against heretics and apostates. If such is the case, Augustine 
may be partly to blame for the religious persecution of the Middle Ages, which 
came to be looked upon as a prime example of the inhumanity fostered by the 
undue exaltation of moral standards and became one of the principal criticisms 
leveled at the church throughout the modern period.57
Here Fortin sheds light on how many moderns would blame Augustinian thought for 
much historical violence and strife. If religious pluralism does not compromise justice, 
how is earthly peace possible? I strongly agree with the modern’s critique, but a fair and 
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charitable look at Augustine’s thoughts and reactions would show that any modern 
separation completely splitting Christian justice and earthly peace is false.  
Proper consideration towards Augustine’s views reveals that a modern critique of 
Augustinian justice to be something of a misconception. Divine justice does not translate 
very well with the contemporary understanding, but Augustine’s letters on the Donatists 
show a liberal compassion and tolerance that was rare in the ancient world. Augustine 
insists that “true faith and right understanding” is much more powerful than a world of 
“temporal whips and scourges”.58 Augustine urges for a path to quelling the heresy that is 
rational, non-destructive, and helpful. The path to converting heresy must be peaceful and 
not spiral into an ‘eye for an eye,’ tit for tat mentality. Ancient conventions of torture, 
extortion, and false confessions are similarly inconsistent with divine justice.59 Instead, 
conversion must come from voluntary dialogue and the power of reason, lest “counterfeit 
Catholics” become another obstacle for humanity.60 Augustine’s practical concern for 
non-believers echoes his thought in Book XIX:  
For, as long as the two cities are mingled together, we can make use of the peace 
of Babylon. Faith can assure our exodus from Babylon, but our pilgrim status, for 
the time being, makes us neighbors.61
Imperfect peace on earth, which is far separate from divine justice, has an instrumentality 
for strengthening the faith of believers and demands that they respect others. Divine 
justice calls for respecting other humans as creatures of God, even if they are non-
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believers. Augustine warns those that ignore the peaceful approach: “[…] whoever 
misuses his gifts on earth will both lose what he has and never receive the better gifts of 
heaven.”62 Augustine would respond to the modern critic that inhumane persecution is 
fundamentally un-Christian. If cornered with the question of compromise with other thick 
doctrines, Augustine might admit that Christianity is uncompromising; it will not admit 
truth where there is untruth. He would clarify, however, that the confrontation of choice 
is not the bloody battlefield of the misguided, but in hearts and minds of the humane and 
reasonable. The first line of defense for Augustinian justice against non-believers 
involves dialogue, mercy, patience, toleration, and reason. 
 While peace from the just, proper order is most important when living with non-
Christians, Augustine is not an outright pacifist. Force may become necessary when 
civility decays. Augustine grew to endorse protection and economic sanctions against the 
Donatists when their violence, and in some instances their brutality, became prolific.63 A 
counterinsurgency against the Donatists was permitted as long as it was conducted in 
accordance with Augustinian justice, which is to say in accordance with divinely 
ordained reason, proportionality, and humanism. In response to the targeted killing and 
mutilation of innocent priests, Augustine demanded mercy on the state’s part to make 
room for voluntary conversion. Civil and humane arrest, trial, confinement, and forced 
labor were the appropriate response to terrorism in the eyes of justice. 64 Not only was 
this sort of force just, but it had a practical utility compared to brutality in avoiding the 
worst-case scenario: a society ferociously pacified, but with the result of false believers 
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and underground faiths that ruin the chance of any authentic faith. If Augustine learned of 
the 30 Years War, he would not be surprised given what he saw in his time, and would be 
just as horrified as any modern political philosopher. The legates and vigiles of 
Augustine’s time were necessary; the difference with the Roman pagan is that a Christian 
would not look at their work as a glory but as a necessary yet regrettable last resort. 
 A strict view of Augustine’s philosophy would not blame itself for the ‘fact of 
history’. It would blame, instead, the sorry state of human psychology. While I recognize 
the philosophical arguments that Augustinian justice would make, I remain highly 
sympathetic to the modern outlook. The comprehensiveness of divine justice carries with 
it a certainty that is so strong that the non-ideal circumstances of human psychology drive 
it towards its most horrible practical conclusion. The political liberal would accept this 
justice within the scope of the overlapping consensus, but the fact of history gives ample 
cause for a high degree of suspicion towards it. I see that Augustine has serious and 
agreeable replies to religious warfare from the ideal perspective, but the non-ideal 
perspective offers an alarm. Whatever divine justice says, that warning is that 
comprehensive outlooks are politically dangerous. The challenge behind any conception 
of comprehensive liberalism is the fact of history. A small non-ideal mix-up in the 
formula of liberalism would cause havoc if it were comprehensive. I am not enthusiastic 
of how Augustine responds to this difficulty; I think the lesson here drives an intuition 
that any conception of comprehensive liberalism cannot make excuses if it wishes to 
maintain beyond the ideal and into the non-ideal. 
Augustine’s understanding of justice, in a word, is God’s Justice. It only exists as 
a divine virtue, orienting towards the perfect order of things, and making all harmony 
 ͵Ͷ
possible. Irrationality, arbitrary power, paganism, or pantheism certainly cannot secure 
justice. Other potential sources for justice such as philosophy, pleasure, consensus, or 
nature cannot secure justice by themselves. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that 
reason and nature could point towards a justice compatible with faith, but ‘this justice’ or 
‘that peace’ or ‘those orders’ are contingent reflections of actual Justice. A modern 
political thinker might repulse at such a conception of justice with the argument that it is 
squarely to blame for innumerable atrocities in the name of an unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrine. This argument is a confusion, as a review of Augustine’s 
thought and historical attitude demonstrate Augustinian justice as extremely agreeable to 
the modern liberal. Augustine had a sight for justice that unified the demands of morality 
with the concern for tolerance. I do think there are strong and convincing objections to it, 
but I also think this is helpful in outlining the political liberal’s charge against 
comprehensiveness. The contention of Augustinian justice is highly applicable to the 
contemporary debate in that it backs a failed form of comprehensive liberalism, 
demonstrating how fatal the fact of history is to any comprehensive liberal conception. If 
Augustine presented a type of liberalism that failed, perhaps John Locke’s theory could 
be presented as a successful liberalism that is comprehensive.  
 ͵ͷ
Chapter 3 - Lockean Liberalism from Comprehensive Natural Law 
There is no question that John Locke’s The Second Treatise of Government
presents a modern liberalism that had raging success in practical application. The 
political principles that justify liberalism therein, however, are not found in the practical 
need for a reasonable modus vivendi, but rather on the comprehensive supposition of 
Natural Law. The Lockean political structure includes consent of the governed, 
democratic consensus, inviolability of person, procedural justice, and most other rights 
written in modern liberal constitutions. He derives these political rights from Natural Law 
imperatives. The contemporary political liberal might have no problem accepting Locke’s 
Natural Law in that it is a reasonable doctrine reinforcing the two principles of justice via 
the overlapping consensus. They could not, however, accept it if it were a thick moral 
conception, which served as the measure of liberalism, before any other competing 
doctrines are even considered. The question then becomes what function Natural Law 
serves within Lockean liberalism. Does it serve as a doctrine that reinforces the public 
standards of justice and reason, accidental to the liberal project? Or does it serve as the 
comprehensive golden apple from which the silver frame of liberalism exists?65 I argue 
that Locke’s political theory is fundamentally grounded on Natural Law as a thick, moral, 
comprehensive doctrine. If that is the case, I take Locke’s politics as an example of 
comprehensive liberalism, not political liberalism. It does not depend on any consensus 
with other doctrines and it positively establishes moral principles before political ones are 
set. I realize that the political liberal would take exception to my accusation that it is a 
thin modus vivendi, but in any case, I think Locke’s liberalism is not thin. I maintain that 
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Lockean Natural Law is a comprehensive (not political) doctrine because it appeals to 
reason, God, and nature in order to secure moral precepts which ground any possible 
political society. If Locke’s theory is indeed comprehensive, it would be valuable to the 
contemporary theorist as an example of comprehensive liberalism that avoided the 
pitfalls of Augustine and the fact of history. 
3.1 Lockean Liberalism from the Lens of the Contemporary Liberalism Debate 
Locke would probably agree with the Rawlsian ‘fact of history’ since he lived in a 
world fresh from these wars. The subsequent English Civil War in the later 17th century 
was a further alarming, personal political concern which only reinforced his search for 
peace. The contemporary liberal has the comfort of knowing the end of WWII and the 
fall of the Soviet Union as historical milestones of liberalism; Locke did not. It is safe to 
say that the ‘fact of history’ catalyzes Locke’s Enlightenment liberalism just as much as, 
if not more than contemporary liberalism. A cursory look at his other works such as A
Letter Concerning Toleration further supports this idea.66 There is no doubt that one of 
Locke’s objectives as an early modern theorist was social tolerance. It could also 
probably be said that Locke held tolerance as a matter of importance for liberalism 
greater than Augustine did. 
Locke’s ideas manifested in successful real-world circumstances in that they saw 
the need for toleration in politics, but I do not think his solution was the subordination of 
metaphysics to practical politics. On the contrary, the key to Locke’s conception of 
liberalism is Natural Law, a thick moral concept with rock-solid epistemological and 
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religious aspects. I consider Natural Law to be a reasonable comprehensive doctrine that 
is compatible with other reasonable doctrines. I take the difference, however, between 
Lockean liberalism and contemporary political liberalism to be that the former is 
specifically grounded on the comprehensive doctrine of Natural Law. I see that Locke 
justified Natural Law heavily on Christian revelation, further making it a platform that 
the contemporary political liberal could not accept apart from the background culture. 
Rawls himself saw natural law theories in general to be comprehensive doctrines that 
political liberalism moves away from.67 I agree, but I wish to be clear: I do not think that 
the political liberal would object to the use of Natural Law as a doctrine which helps 
justify liberalism within the scope of an overlapping consensus. Rather, I argue that 
Natural Law is a deep metaphysical and moral doctrine and the sole platform upon which 
Locke constructs the political outcomes of liberalism. Locke’s Two Treatises specifically
replies to the divine right of kings as an individual doctrine, not against whether any 
particular comprehensive doctrine can serve as political justification. In sum, I argue in 
this chapter that Lockean liberalism from 'justice as thick Natural Law' is an instance of 
successful comprehensive liberalism. 
3.2 Natural Law is a Universal Law of Reason 
Reason plays a critical role in Lockean Natural Law. From an Enlightenment 
perspective it takes the most important role, if not what some might consider to be the 
most cogent role with regards to secular ideas of liberalism. Locke invokes reason when 
first giving a full definition of Natural Law: “And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all 
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Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”68 Reason helps support 
Natural Law in that it draws a sense of universality to it. Natural Law is given to all 
humans through reason; whoever can exercise reason will positively know it. In this way, 
reason acts as a judge for humanity. Reason will answer when God or a political judge 
will not. Locke elaborates: “Men living together according to reason, without a common 
Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is properly the State of 
Nature.”69 Natural Law is legitimate in that it is an impartial judge which helps arbitrate 
humanity's issues. War begins when this impartial judge is absent, making it a practical 
necessity. Locke does recognize, however, that not everyone exercises reason. He 
identifies particular self-interest or ignorance as obstacles to recognizing the reason 
behind Natural Law.70 Ignorance and lack of interest are ways that obscure Natural Law 
to some. Lack of interest might be a pernicious obstacle to learning the Natural Law, but 
ignorance, save negligence, is a common obstacle even from a young age. When 
someone has no excuse to not use reason, they forfeit Natural Law: “Any one may 
destroy a Man who makes War upon him […] because such Men are not under the ties of 
the Common Law of Reason […]”71 War between mankind occurs when there is a 
breakdown in reason in one mode or the other. Anyone who dispenses it maliciously can 
be treated like a beast. Reason teaches humanity the Natural Law, and whoever 
voluntarily tosses away the burden of reason also forfeits its benefit.  
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 Locke's use of reason in Natural Law very is further illuminated when discussing 
how reason plays a role in children and paternal power. Natural Law demands respect for 
children although they have not fully achieved reasonability. A criminal may be treated 
as a beast because they have maliciously rejected reason; children, though they also do 
not fully exercise reason, must be educated and respected. Children attain adulthood 
when they can fully exercise reason. Until then, they must obey their parents:  
[…] he that is not come to the Use of his Reason, cannot be said to be under this 
Law; […] For Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the
direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest72
What this means is that children have a degree of freedom from the Natural Law 
specifically because they cannot use reason. Locke paints a baby's ignorant condition 
almost as a curse in that they lack direction and full agency. Children are expected to 
listen to their parents, not the Natural Law, because they are incapable of knowing it 
without reason. Locke highlights the importance of reason and Natural Law in achieving 
adulthood. When does the Natural Law apply to a child? 
I answer; State of Maturity wherein he might be suppos'd capable to know that 
Law, that so he might keep his Actions within the Bounds of it. When he has 
acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that Law is to be his Guide, 
and how far he may make use of his Freedom, and so comes to have it [...]73
Maturity is when a child acquires reason and becomes an adult. When reason is attained, 
so is an understanding of Natural Law. The age of reason is not exact, but coincidentally 
judged by other reasonable people. Lockean Natural Law establishes that reason is a 
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critical requirement if man wishes to be treated as such, with the key exceptions of 
children or the mentally handicapped. If reason is taken in this Lockean way, it is an 
example of an epistemological or moral74 demand on humans that Rawls tries to avoid. 
Reason partly shows how Lockean Natural Law is a thick doctrine. 
3.3 Natural Law is Empirically Affirmed 
The weight and certainty of Natural Law for Locke is only increased by science. 
An empirical look at humanity as a whole shows an essential homogeneity. To contradict 
Natural Law would be to contradict the truth of nature. Locke famously espouses the 
equality of man:  
[…] Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same 
advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one 
amongst another without Subordination or Subjection, unless the Lord […] should 
by any manifest Declaration of his Will set one above another […]75
The biological traits that make men equal are the ones that are common to all mankind. 
There are faculties that distinguish men from other creatures such as the use of reason or 
upright walking. When considering humanity in terms of nature, humans are not much 
different to each other. Locke seemingly mocks the proponents of monarchy by noting 
that when there is a man that is above others, God will surely let the rest of humanity 
know per Biblical examples. Mankind is born equal, but what Locke more accurately 
means that man is equal in any way that matters. Accidental differences between humans, 
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such as particular size or talent, are not essential differences. Locke explains that human 
equality is not literal:  
Though I have said […] That all Men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed 
to understand all sorts of Equality: […] Excellency of Parts and Merit may place 
others above the Common Level […] and yet all this consists with the Equality,
which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another, 
which was the Equality I there spoke of, as proper to the Business in hand, being 
that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being 
subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man.76
When Locke presents the equality of man, he does not mean the equality of their parts. 
His more pertinent intention is that any given human can walk, think, or live freely. 
Locke's purpose is to abstract away the fleeting constructs of government and look at 
humans as a whole. Locke's observation shows that humanity is most critically equal in 
their freedom from each other. 
 Natural Law is not merely a philosophical exercise because it can be 
demonstrated in nature. Locke brings forward the Americas as an example of a land in 
which Natural Law reigns most clearly.77 His point is that Natural Law exists, and it 
exists before, during, and long after any government. Man is an equal being when it 
comes to their individual sovereignty. Locke saw this as a natural fact that no political 
conception could erase. This is to say, Natural Law stands as a matter of empirical fact 
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regardless of any sort of government or consent.78 It is an imperative prior to government 
and cannot be overruled. Locke explains how Natural Law sets the standard for society:
The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in Society, but only in many 
Cases are drawn closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties annexed to 
them, to inforce their observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal 
Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others, The Rules that they make for other 
Mens Actions, must, as well as their own and other Mens Actions, be 
conformable to the Law of Nature […] no Human Sanction can be good, or valid 
against it.79
Locke sees Natural Law as an “Eternal Rule” that can only be amplified by humans, not 
curtailed. Consent of the governed, functions of government, or judicial proceedings are 
political manifestations that ultimately serve Natural Law. Locke’s conception of 
liberalism is grounded on Natural Law as a fact seen in nature. 
3.4 Natural Law is Divinely Revealed 
To review Locke’s Natural Law thus far, it is a thick law that carries its 
universality and truth from nature and reason. The overwhelming evidence of Natural 
Law grants it a moral status above and prior to government. Locke reviews his support of 
Natural Law most broadly when he introduces his conception of property. The idea of 
property is not political or arbitrary. Property is made possible regardless of government 
through the Natural Law: 
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Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us, that Men, being once born, 
have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such 
other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence: Or Revelation, which gives 
us an account of those Grants God made of the World to Adam, and to Noah, and 
his Sons, 'tis very clear, that God, as King David says, Psal.CXV. xvj. Has given 
the Earth to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in common.80
I take this to be Locke’s most succinct and encompassing explanation of Natural Law. 
Reason and nature grants man the liberty of their person, not any which government or 
consensus that they made no promise with. Besides reason and nature comes a third 
comprehensive aspect of Natural Law: religion.  
Locke does not hide the religiosity of Natural Law. Reason and nature offer 
excellent paths for anyone to understand rules for humanity, but there is yet a third path 
which offers more illumination on those rules. Locke sees man not only as naturally free 
and equal, but also as creatures of God: 
For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise 
Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order 
and about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they are, made 
to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure.81
Being a creature of God carries with it some benefits and burdens. Locke focuses on the 
burden that humans have in obeying the will of God insofar as we are His creation. 
Revealed laws on killing or stealing must be obeyed because not only humans expect it 
but also God demands it, and enforces it with divine punishments and rewards. There is a 
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difficulty here in that Locke’s own categories of property are applied to God (the way 
that God ‘owns’ humanity), but he might say this is justified in that we have the Bible to 
know property in the first place. Natural Law applies to humans insofar as they are part 
of an eternal order under God, which carries certain obligations.
 Locke thinks revelation plays a critical role in promulgating Natural Law. When 
discussing criminals, Locke suggests that reason is reinforced by Natural Law. Those 
“who having renounced Reason, the common Rule and Measure, God hath given to 
Mankind [...]”82 are criminals. Reason, in Locke’s view, is a path to Natural Law but 
exists in mankind from the Christian narrative. Locke continues with a biblical 
justification for Natural Law in that reason and nature were divinely granted to humans. 
If humanity was made in God’s image, humans have a capacity to comprehend revealed 
truths: “And upon this is grounded the great Law of Nature, Who so sheddeth Mans 
Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, […] so plain 
was it writ in the Hearts of all Mankind.”83 Locke considers revelation as a designed 
psychological aptness for Natural Law that even criminals since Cain have. Not only are 
miracles and the Bible sources for the human understanding of Natural Law, but so is 
human understanding in being a creature designed by God. Locke adamantly rejected 
innate ideas in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, so how is it possible that he 
can support Natural Law as an inward truth from grace? Reason as a support for Natural 
Law acquires its universality not just from God’s eternal order but via the capacity for 
any proper human to think. The Law of Reason is not an innate idea planted by God, but 
rather a uniquely human faculty made possible from and through God.  
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The Natural Law is not simply a political solution for Locke, but a 'great' 
imperative that precedes any government. Locke establishes reason, nature, and 
revelation as three thick sources from which Natural Law is derived. While Natural Law 
can be achieved from these sources, Locke sees them as having a mutually reinforcing 
congruence. The congruence of reason, nature, and revelation further shows how Natural 
Law is a comprehensive system. Various concerns of humanity are addressed in this 
general unified doctrine. The congruent aspects of Natural Law could not be clearer: 
God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also given them reason 
to make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience. The Earth, and 
all that is therein, is given to Men for the Support and Comfort of their being.84
Locke’s view is that reason and nature were given to man by God, and in this way reason 
and nature have a justification to them that approaches the sacred. Throughout different 
levels of human association, from parenting to legislating, Natural Law draws a positive 
authority from divine revelation. God's Commandments and Word serve as revealed 
truths that, along with other truths, form the normative precepts that support liberalism. 
Revelation, reason, and nature are congruent with each other, strengthening my view that 
Natural Law is a thick doctrine. 
3.5 Objections to a 'Comprehensive Liberalism' Reading of Locke and Replies 
Here I address three objections to my understanding of Lockean Natural Law. 
First, some might argue that while Locke discusses revelation as a potential justification 
to Natural Law, his use of religion in his arguments serves other practical ends. Locke 
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had to avoid censorship and persecution if he wanted any of his ideas to be shared at all. 
It may be that Locke extensively uses and responds to religion as merely a rhetorical 
pivot point. A critic might view the Bible and Christianity as a rhetorical necessity to 
convince others given the ethos of his time. When the practical concern for political 
change was at stake, Locke may have seen religion as a critical tool of persuasion in the 
public and academic spheres. It may also be very well argued that even if Locke invoked 
sincere religion as a major pillar of his ideas, Locke was biased towards a non-canonical 
deism which favored empiricism. Locke takes the Bible as factual revealed evidence, but 
his emphasis might have been in an Enlightenment 'Nature's God' type God.  
 Further arguments against the comprehensiveness of Lockean Natural Law 
include the view that his use of 'reason' and 'nature' are purposefully public and neutral. 
They might be interpreted in Locke's framework as thin presuppositions that do not put 
any strict demand on a private individual's doctrines, especially religious ones. An 
alternate view of Natural Law might be this: Locke's vision for Natural Law specifically 
sought after thin presuppositions that could be compatible with anyone's religion (unless 
it was an atheistic belief in nothing). Locke’s tumultuous time period demanded that he 
innovate political philosophy with tolerant and political justifications, not incompatibly 
thick doctrines. Locke's invocation of reason and nature might be seen as a cornerstone in 
the Enlightenment trend of moving away from hard religious dogmas and towards 
humane and scientific approaches.  
 A third understanding of Natural Law within the scope of the Enlightenment 
might result in a thinner Law than suspected. A critic might motion towards how Locke 
believed in the rights of non-believers in wild lands:
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The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure, 
and is still a Tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that 
another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the 
support of his Life.85
Locke understood Natural Law to apply to any human, regardless of accidental 
differences. Natural Law applies just as much to the Indian who “knows no Inclosure” as 
to Christendom. Taken together, a more critical and contextual inspection of Locke’s 
Natural Law might suggest a Law of openness, humanity, and toleration, which 
unfortunately had to conform with religious dogma to gain any sort of practical traction 
in 17th century Europe. 
These objections can be divided between the philosophical and historical. I wish 
to respond first to the philosophical objection of ‘political’ or ‘reasonable’ Natural Law. I 
do not doubt that Lockean liberalism carries sense of toleration in its doctrine, much 
more so than other doctrines of the time. I do reiterate the view, however, that it presents 
toleration as a strong positive prescription. It marks the boundaries of political possibility 
not from neutral plurality, but from strong moral convictions. I think Natural Law carries 
an aura of neutrality not from mere or practical reasonable plurality, but from reasonable 
plurality insofar as the combination of nature, reason, and God unilaterally expect it. 
Natural Law is not achieved as a result of a consenting body of reasonable people, but 
actually as the grounding for the question ‘Do you consent?’ in the first place. 
 As for the historical objection of interpreting Locke’s use of religion, I think this 
view is sound but non-decisive. Locke’s other works, the anonymity of the Two
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Treatises, and his vehement use of revelation make me skeptical of this objection. It 
cannot be denied from a historical perspective that Locke was somehow Christian. 
Locke’s other works suggested that he took his religion seriously. We might grant that 
the religious aspects of his life were a practical ruse, or that he was not a Christian in any 
orthodox sense. Even if we grant an opaque religiosity in Locke, I fail to see how the fear 
of persecution would affect the religiosity of Two Treatises since they were published 
anonymously. Finally, I might accept that Locke invoked religious arguments for the sake 
of persuasion, but I only do so begrudgingly considering how vehemently and 
passionately Locke invokes Christianity in the text. Perhaps this is a testament to Locke’s 
strong rhetorical skills. I concede that an alternate historical view of Locke’s work puts 
religion in a secondary rhetorical role, but only with great hesitation. Whatever the 
historical case may be, I do not think the cynical stance would seriously detract from my 
argument that Natural Law, as Locke specifically outlined in Two Treatises, is 
comprehensive. 
If we grant that Locke's conception was de facto explicated most properly in an 
Enlightenment context, I maintain that Lockean Natural Law is still a heavy 
comprehensive doctrine that will not easily compromise outside its framework. I do not 
think that tabling the religiosity of Natural Law would turn it significantly political or 
neutral. My take is that Locke did not see Natural Law as a possible avenue to liberalism 
among other reasonable doctrines, but as the avenue. I doubt that Lockean Natural Law 
would compromise with other reasonable doctrines such as an atheistic utilitarianism or 
idealistic deontology, even if based on practical reason without revelation. Natural Law, 
even if non-religious, paints a broad picture of the human good in a general capacity. It 
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prescribes rules for humans on a moral an epistemological level, explicitly well before 
any sort of political association or consent is made. Even with putting religion aside, I 
think an Enlightenment look at Natural Law maintains its comprehensiveness. This 
would have contemporary political philosophical implications beyond the debate 
surrounding Rawls’s ideas. I anticipate a comprehensive view of Lockean Natural Law 
would show that Nozick’s libertarianism is far less libertarian than expected. Lockean 
liberal conceptions such as consent of the governed or bureaucratic accountability are 
made possible in the first place by the imperatives of Natural Law. Indeed, the entire 
matter of Lockean liberal society is extended, limited, or otherwise formed upon the hard 
and fast rules of Natural Law, even if religion was taken out of the picture. A 
contemporary lens would draw from this thesis that Natural Law lead to a successfully 
manifested comprehensive liberalism in Locke’s time. The contemporary theorist cannot 
deny that comprehensive liberalism, if not at least possible, is sustainable and can have 
positive historical effects. To fast forward a couple hundred years, Rawls sought to move 
away from his contemporary type of comprehensive liberalism rather than embrace it like 
Locke. Rawls focused on a conception of political liberalism, but I think whether his 
philosophical efforts were successful remains doubtful. 
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Chapter 4 - Comprehensiveness in Rawls’s Political Liberalism 
My main argument in this chapter is that while Rawls sought to move away from 
a thick moral conception of the just society, his resulting political liberalism still contains 
three significant elements which are comprehensive. First, I will introduce the discussion 
of the thick aspects of Rawls's liberalism with a thematic overview of Ruth Abbey and 
Jeff Spinner-Halev's “Rawls, Mill, and the Puzzle of Political Liberalism.” Next, I will 
list ideas within TJ which demonstrate Rawls's attempt to remain political despite an 
overall comprehensive system. Then, I will review Rawls's own discussion of moving 
away from a comprehensive system in TJ to a more strictly political system in PL. After 
that, I will highlight thick moral aspects of PL which demonstrate comprehensive 
undertones in Rawls's liberal society. Finally, I will respond to the objection that though 
Rawls may use morally charged language in describing features of the liberal society, his 
system remains technically political. The overall objective here is to show how a 
contemporary formulation of political liberalism, even for a great such as Rawls, simply 
cannot help but fall into liberalism’s inherent philosophical assumptions. 
4.1 Rawls's Liberalism is Thick Compared to John Stuart Mill's 
Abbey and Spinner-Halev's “Rawls, Mill, and the Puzzle of Political Liberalism” 
aims at comparing how Rawls's liberalism is comprehensive in contrast to Mill's 
liberalism, despite the opposite argument from Rawls.86 This comparison includes 
analysis of Mill's liberalism, but for the focus of this essay, Abbey and Spinner-Halev 
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also describe comprehensive features of Rawls's liberalism. One feature is that Rawls 
accuses Mill's liberalism of a comprehensive notion of autonomy, although Rawls's own 
notion of autonomy from private conceptions of the good is very comparable to Mill's. 
Put succinctly, “Rawls starts out trying to show the distance between political and 
comprehensive liberalisms but ends up confessing their proximity.”87  Beyond autonomy 
lies the matter of justice. Abbey and Spinner-Halev contrast how, in the thick Rawlsian 
conception, justice is “imposed” by the institutions of the state, while in the Millian 
conception, justice operates in the more limited avenue of virtuous social cooperation.88
Finally, after justice lies the matter of stability. Rawls argues for the two principles of 
justice through reason as requisites for stability, but in contrast with Mill, such insistence 
undermines a stable pluralism. In the words of Abbey and Spinner-Halev, “Rawls is 
caught between his conception of stability, which contains a stringent demand for 
agreement, and the fact of pluralism.”89 Rawls argues that Mill promotes a 
comprehensive liberalism which political liberalism seeks to avoid, but when their 
systems are compared in terms of autonomy, justice, and stability, Rawl's system is the 
one which seems more comprehensive. 
 The comprehensiveness of Rawls's liberalism is not a new point of discussion. 
The comparison that Abbey and Spinner-Haley make falls in line with a group of scholars 
who maintain Rawls's comprehensive leanings:  
Since its inception, many commentators have examined and often criticized the 
ideas associated with political liberalism, and some have argued that Rawls’s 
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version of political liberalism is not as distant from comprehensive liberalism as 
he would have us believe.90
Some scholars go beyond merely arguing over the degree of comprehensiveness of 
Rawls's liberalism and support it as more sustainable than his political conception.91
Others, following Rawls's lead, defend a shift towards the political.92 This chapter 
follows discussions of Rawls's comprehensiveness in a limited way. I do not wish to 
decisively answer how successful Rawls's transition from the metaphysical to the 
political was. Rather, I intend to emphasize aspects of political liberalism which 
ironically point towards the very comprehensive conceptions that Rawls sought to avoid. 
Against some discussion over Rawls's comprehensiveness in his later work, I concede to 
the fact that his arguments remain political, technically speaking, despite the thick moral 
vocabulary he sometimes invokes. Plainly speaking, I do think that the three 
comprehensive aspects 'poison the well' of the political focus of Rawls's liberalism. 
Whether or not Rawls's late political liberalism is actually comprehensive I leave an open 
question. I think, however, that Rawls’s unavoidable use of comprehensive elements in 
PL (along with the previous historical and philosophical analysis) point us to the 
underlying comprehensiveness of the liberal ideal. “Rawls, Mill, and the Puzzle of 
Political Liberalism” follows a line of debate that Rawls's political liberalism is more 
comprehensive than he would admit, and this essay follows that debate not so much as to 
conclusively assert the comprehensiveness of his later work, but only to note and catalog 
its comprehensive aspects. 
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4.2 Rawls's Attempts to Thin Out the Comprehensiveness of TJ93
 I reiterate a fact from earlier in this thesis: there can be no doubt that, whether 
Rawls's later political liberalism is morally thick or thin, his early liberalism in TJ is a 
comprehensive moral doctrine. TJ contains many aspects which seek to prop up a thin 
sort of liberalism. The well-ordered society, however, arises from too many thick moral 
concepts, and it encompasses too much of human life to ignore. To begin, it is clear that 
Rawls does invoke a variety of thin concepts within TJ. Among these thin concepts 
include: the priority of the right, thin theory of the good over a full theory; toleration and 
priority of liberty despite competing views (including intolerant views); and the 
importance of the political sphere in terms of cooperation, specific legislation, and 
conflict resolution. These are key thin concepts which Rawls greatly emphasized in later 
works, but within TJ, they are relegated towards pluralizing and stabilizing an otherwise 
thick liberalism. Comprehensive aspects of Rawls's well-ordered society include: the 
emphasis of substantive over merely formal justice; the specific premise of Kantian 
deliberative rationality as goodness overruling other philosophical arguments; the 
assumption that not only will all people be capable of reason, they will also be imbued 
with a sense of justice in their lifetimes; proper day-to-day interactions in society, to 
include interactions within the family, would reinforce the sense of justice; and some 
exceptions to the two principles of justice in order to alleviate the problem of envy. The 
moral emphasis within TJ is clear, and it is so thick and far-reaching that there can be no 
debate that Rawls's early conception of the liberal society is comprehensive.  
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4.3 Rawls's Shift from Comprehensive Liberalism to Political Liberalism 
14 years after TJ Rawls sought to revise the comprehensive nature of his just 
liberal society by stressing its thin political aspects. His reconception began with “Justice 
as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” (“PM”) in 1985.94 Among other articles, Rawls 
also discusses his revisions with earlier work in the first introduction to PL.95 Rawls's 
revisionary attitude is slightly different between “PM” and PL; in “PM” he takes a 
clarifying stance, while in PL it is more acquiescing and forthright. Whatever tone Rawls 
uses in his revisions, there is a clear shift between his earlier liberalism of TJ and that of 
PL.
 Rawls discusses his move away from the comprehensiveness of TJ in “PM”. His 
entire goal in “PM” is to demonstrate how “the public conception of justice is to be 
political, not metaphysical” by avoiding “claims to universal truth, or claims about the 
essential nature and identity of persons.”96 These sort of sweeping metaphysical or 
epistemological claims are exactly the sort which the politically liberal society ought to 
avoid in order to secure plurality, stability, publicity, and legitimacy. In other words, 
“justice as fairness is not intended as the application of a general moral conception to the 
basic structure of society.”97 Rawls insists within “PM” that his conception of the liberal 
society in TJ, with relation to the person, is not as morally thick as it seems: 
Although this conception is a moral conception, it is not, as I have said, intended 
as a comprehensive moral doctrine. The conception of the citizen as a free and 
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95 PL, xiii-xxxiv, 490. 
96 “PM”, 388. 
97 Ibid., 390. 
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equal person is not a moral ideal to govern all of life, but is rather an ideal 
belonging to a conception of political justice which is to apply to the basic 
structure.98
The grounding of the just liberal society is not to be found in comprehensive doctrines, 
but in “basic intuitive ideas” that citizens could agree upon.99 The political undercurrent 
of justice seems to contradict Rawls's earlier use of Kantian rationality and the original 
position. Rawls replies that his “Kantian constructivism” was a practical mechanism to 
avoid epistemic and metaphysical issues surrounding moral and political values.100 He 
also replies that the original position was simply “a device of representation” to illustrate 
the fairness of free and reasonable decisions agreed on by different parties.101 Rawls 
explains in this paper what he “failed to stress sufficiently”102 in TJ, which is that the 
conception of justice as fairness is limited to the political realm. 
 Rawls takes advantage of his introduction in PL in order to explain his shift away 
from the comprehensive liberalism of TJ. PL was written 8 years after “PM” and, in 
contrast, Rawls takes a much more forthright attitude about his transition towards a 
political conception. He notes that in TJ, “Nothing is made of the contrast between 
comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines and conceptions limited to the domain 
of the political.”103 Comprehensive doctrines could be just as much philosophical and 
religious as they could be moral, and Rawls admits that the distinction between 
comprehensive and political conceptions was never explained well enough. His 
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discussion of past works and comprehensive doctrines culminates in his admitting the 
comprehensive nature of justice as fairness. If TJ and the idea of comprehensive doctrines 
are taken together, “it is clear, I think, that the text regards justice as fairness and 
utilitarianism as comprehensive, or partially comprehensive doctrines.”104 Rawls 
continues to say, as in “PM”, that “the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness 
is unrealistic. This is because it is inconsistent with realizing its own principles under the 
best foreseeable conditions.”105 Rawls fully admits the comprehensive nature of his 
earlier liberalism. He also observes that it was comprehensive enough as to betray the 
liberalism which his system sought to support in the first place. In trying to establish a 
consistent and deep106 support for liberalism, he constructed a comprehensive doctrine. 
Rawls apologizes for the comprehensive liberalism of TJ: “I don't think I really know 
why I took the course I did. Any story I would tell is likely to be fiction, merely what I 
want to believe.”107 Although with different degrees of humility, Rawls's “PM” and PL
both acknowledge the transition of his liberalism from a comprehensive conception to 
one that is firmly within the domain of the political. 
4.4 The Three Comprehensive Aspects of Rawls's Political Liberalism 
Three distinct comprehensive features of Rawls's later political liberalism can be 
found both in “PM” and PL.108 Rawls aims to rectify the comprehensive nature of his 
earlier work and makes many technical distinctions which assert the political nature of 
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his liberalism. It is not difficult, however, to find thick concepts stubbornly embedded in 
his framework. I would like to clarify that Rawls does not deny that a political conception 
of justice is a moral conception, albeit a thin one, in that it works out values of practical 
institutions.109 Rawls accepts that his work makes thin moral and epistemological claims, 
but there are three particular concepts critical to political liberalism that carry thick and 
comprehensive implications. These concepts are: the historical fact of reasonable 
pluralism; the restraint of reason; and the focal conception of 'very great' values. 
 Rawls introduces the fact of pluralism part II and in his concluding remarks in 
“PM”.110 The fact of pluralism builds upon the intuition and observation that despite 
hundreds of years of competing ideologies there has been no sure answer to a single 
conception of the good. This claim might seem like a purely epistemological one, but 
Rawls also refers to specific examples of historic conflict and strife to support his 
assertion. The Wars of Religion and the resulting doctrines of religious toleration marked 
the turning point in which competing conceptions of the good were more broadly 
accepted in the name of social cooperation. Another way of explaining the fact of 
pluralism is by saying that pluralism is a settled conviction or a provisional fixed point 
upon which the baseline of liberal discussion could be established. Rawls also discusses 
the fact of pluralism within PL. “The most intractable struggles” such as the American 
Civil War, in the long run of history, lead to an undeniably favorable tradition of 
pluralistic toleration. Rawls describes this public tradition as a “shared fund of implicitly 
recognized basic ideas and principles.”111 As objective and thin as he maintains this idea 
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to be, it raises questions of comprehensiveness because it is treated as an assumed fact. 
The fact of pluralism carries an epistemological certainty as to make it difficult to 
differentiate from a philosophical doctrine.
 Another comprehensive aspect of Rawls's political liberalism is the idea of 
reason. Within “PM”, the idea of reason arises from discussion of Kantian constructivism 
and the original position. Reason provides an avenue for agreement and toleration based 
on a thin practicality that avoids a clash of comprehensive doctrines. It affirms the most 
basic interests of all and it restrains discussion to things which any party could at least 
possibly agree with. Reason even becomes public in the free and transparent agreement 
of all parties with regards to different issues or doctrines.112 Rawls's discussion in PL
describes the reasonable person as those who “desire for its own sake a social world in 
which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept.”113
While reasonable persons are not merely rational egoists, Rawls explains that “neither the 
reasonable nor the rational can stand without the other.”114 The rational and reasonable 
agent does not immediately become the perfectly moral Kantian agent in Rawls's political 
liberalism, but the agent's life, including her comprehensive doctrines, are limited by 
reason.115 Rawls affirms that “being reasonable is not an epistemological idea,”116 but 
even so, it is a comprehensive assumption to make of the citizen. A citizen's reasonable 
thought must constitute a comprehensive doctrine if it is to affect every aspect of their 
lives, whether it be guiding their social interactions or limiting their personally held 
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beliefs. Objective or subjective, political or comprehensive, the just society which cannot 
accept the unreasonable person could not be seen as fully liberal, and thus the premise of 
reasonable citizens could only be seen as a comprehensive aspect of it. 
 The third main comprehensive aspect of Rawls's liberalism is the focal political 
conception which results from a just liberal society. This is a concept similar to the fact 
of pluralism except it manifests as a result of a successfully well-ordered society, even 
feeding its stability, rather than prior to even an initial political consensus. The focal 
political conception is the idea that the just liberal society is positively affirmed in the 
private beliefs of citizens rather than merely tolerated by them. It is a result in which 
citizens would “affirm justice as fairness as a natural moral conception that can stand on 
its own feet.”117 In other words, it is a demarcating line where the overlapping consensus, 
in confirming political justice and “virtues of cooperation in everyday life,” might 
graduate to becoming a privately held belief itself.118 Rawls's idea of focal political ideas 
is also present in PL. After a political society has passed its two stages and achieved the 
status of being 'well-ordered', the resulting (or perhaps even surviving) political values 
could be judged to have a special status. If raw power is counterproductive in terms of 
stability, the beliefs of citizens is required for it. Rawls describes the special status of 
resulting political belief:  
[. . .] values of the political are very great values and hence not easily overridden: 
these values govern the basic framework of social life – the very groundwork of 
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our existence – and specify the fundamental terms of political and social 
cooperation.119
These “very great values” constitute the focal class of the well-ordered society and no 
other doctrine could change it. Such 'great values' overrule all other comprehensive 
doctrines in all but the rare circumstance, meaning it could only be best described as 
comprehensive itself. The political focal point of Rawls's liberalism affirms values which 
implies its heavy moral weight.
4.5 The Comprehensive Aspects in Rawls's Liberalism Clash with Its Political Focus 
One possible critique of my observations is that they do not accurately reference 
the moral scope of Rawls's liberalism.120 Justice as fairness does not deny its moral and 
perhaps even partially comprehensive nature, but it does specifically and clearly limit 
itself to the domain of political (including social and economic) human interaction. The 
fact of pluralism is a practical, historical observation within a political scope. Reason is a 
political grounding for the sake of practical cooperation. Very great values are still only 
political values which do not impose on other comprehensive beliefs. The scope of the 
political falls well within the broader sphere of comprehensive doctrines. While I note 
comprehensive aspects of Rawls's doctrine, I only note them by losing a sense of the 
political scope by which his political liberalism is constrained. 
 I do not necessarily disagree with this criticism. I think that Rawls diligently 
asserts the political sphere of his liberalism despite some sweeping terms. I respond, 
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however, by saying that the use of ideas which conjure comprehensive doctrines 
fundamentally clashes with the political focus of Rawls's liberalism. One possible 
recommendation is that these concepts be revised to reflect the political leanings of 
Rawls's liberalism. The three comprehensive aspects could be reworded121 from 
metaphysically or epistemologically charged wording such as 'very great values' or 'fact 
of pluralism' to more political and neutral vocabulary such as 'public beliefs' or 'practical 
agreement'. If the scope of Rawls's political liberalism cannot be expanded to a wider 
moral status, then the three major comprehensive aspects supporting it which I have 
noted should be revised in order to emphasize its limited domain. Until then, this 
convinces me that any conception of liberalism, even political, by its nature cannot avoid 
comprehensiveness. 
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Chapter 5 - Raz vs Quong: Comprehensive vs Political Liberalism
A look at the comprehensiveness of liberalism philosophically and in history 
identifies its challenges yet unavoidability. The question then becomes: Is a contemporary 
theory of comprehensive liberalism possible? We seek comprehensive justifications in 
order to anchor liberalism, but can we stabilize them? At the center stage of the 
contemporary liberal debate is the question of how comprehensive liberalism is, or ought 
to be. This debate is best represented by the contrasting views of Joseph Raz in The
Morality of Freedom122 and Jonathan Quong in Liberalism Without Perfection123. Raz 
takes a perfectionist approach to liberalism, arguing for not just passive protection, but 
active promotion of liberal principles through the moral foundation of autonomy. Quong's 
stance opposes Raz through the argument that liberalism is a thin conception, and it 
cannot act upon or even establish any thick moral conceptions lest it betrays itself. Raz's 
position is a decent contender for an acceptable, contemporary instance of positive 
freedom. Quong, on the other hand, moves contrary to Raz in the hopes of grounding 
liberalism in negative freedom. I agree with Raz: a consistent and honest liberal theory 
must admit its own comprehensiveness. Liberalism cannot achieve principles, enforce 
duties, or expect reasonability without commitment to moral assumptions or convictions 
on the good life. Liberalism turns into a libertarian modus vivendi without these moral 
foundations; a 'wet napkin' end state which liberals would seek to avoid. My view moves 
against Quong, but I do find some of Raz's perfectionism to be troubling as well. First I 
will outline Raz and Quong's views on liberalism. Then I will present a preliminary 
argument in favor of comprehensive liberalism which includes some intuitive objections 
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to both Quong and Raz. In this chapter I affirm that the most proper conception of 
liberalism, given the contemporary debate, must be comprehensively liberal, though I 
cannot fully take Raz’s side. 
5.1 An Outline of Raz's Positive Freedom Oriented Liberalism 
 Joseph Raz argues for a perfectionist form of liberalism. Raz's system of 
liberalism is one in which: authority is justified through subject reasons; the assumption 
of individual autonomy grounds freedom and other liberal values into a doctrine of 
liberty; encourages positive action rather than just negative action in support of collective 
goods; and arrives at a state that must promote and extend the autonomous life. What 
makes Raz's liberalism perfectionist is that it identifies a moral foundation (autonomy, in 
this case) and actively predicates society's benefits and burdens upon it. This form of 
liberalism is the most positive one on the spectrum because it justifies a state which will 
seek out ways to maximize the collective autonomy of its citizens. Raz sees this 
accomplished not by simply protecting individuals from the state, but providing the 
environment and resources that expand an individual's opportunities. Raz sees liberalism 
as stemming from a fact of autonomy, and authority exists to promote it.  
 Raz begins with the question of legitimacy. Autonomous people are not 
compelled by the government through public consent or duty to liberal principles. Rather, 
the government serves as an aid for people to act within reasons that apply to them. Raz 
calls this the normal justification thesis (NJT):  
The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons 
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which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts 
the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow 
them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.124
According to the NJT, the government is a cooperative agent that helps the autonomous 
individual navigate all reasons that are pertinent to them. The NJT is Raz's criteria for 
legitimacy, but consent of the governed is still valuable. Raz thinks that consent, while 
not decisive, is helpful to authority:
Perfectionist political action may be taken in support of social institutions which 
enjoy unanimous support in the community, in order to give them formal 
recognition, bring legal and administrative arrangements into line with them, 
facilitate their use by members of the community who wish to do so, and 
encourage the transmission of belief in their value to future generations.125
In so many words, Raz sees that consent promotes a well-ordered society. It brings about 
conditions in which individuals generate their own support for authority. Even without 
consent, Raz sees legitimacy stemming from an authority that can bring individuals 
closer to things that are pertinent to them. 
Raz's liberalism is grounded on autonomy as a moral presupposition. This is a 
change from the “instrumental rationality” or “consequentialist morality”126  which 
famously underlie the theories of Rawls or Mill. Raz takes “a perfectionist view of 
freedom, for it regards personal political freedom as an aspect of the good life. It is a 
view of freedom deriving from the value of personal autonomy and from value-
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pluralism.”127  Raz sees autonomy as indispensable, proving value-pluralism because it 
means people can commit to “a variety of morally acceptable options.”128 Strong value-
pluralism asserts intense incommensurability or subjectivity among values, but Raz's 
view of autonomy does not support this. Raz rejects a unilateral value-pluralism in favor 
of pluralism that selects among heavy, defensible, and evaluable moral judgments. The 
autonomous person has flexibility in their moral beliefs as long as those beliefs are 
sound. Autonomy supports pluralism of defensible judgments and ought to be upheld. 
Furthermore, Raz's vision of moral autonomy is not a libertarian one. Autonomy is 
established as the foundation if it is accepted within the pursuit of other goods:  
Autonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good. The ideal of 
autonomy requires only the availability of morally acceptable options. [. . .] A 
moral theory which recognizes the value of autonomy inevitably upholds a 
pluralistic view. It admits the value of a large number of greatly differing pursuits 
among which individuals are free to choose.129
Through autonomy, within the journey to other goods, Raz aims to sweep away some 
false intuitions other liberals have against perfectionism: “The most deeply rooted 
confusion [. . .] is in the thought that anti-perfectionism is necessary to prevent people 
from imposing their favoured style of life on others. The confusion is both practical and 
moral.130 Raz seeks to show how moral perfectionism and freedom are not mutually 
exclusive, and he argues this with autonomy at its foundation. 
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Having asserted autonomy, Raz moves to show how the justified authority can 
best secure it. It is done through both positive and negative action towards collective 
goods rather than just the negative action of other theories. Collective goods are things 
that are important or conducive to the range of autonomous life. They may include a 
standardized system of currency or clean air. According to Raz, collective goods are 
“intrinsically valuable” and permit autonomy:  
The provision of many collective goods is constitutive of the very possibility of 
autonomy and it cannot be relegated to a subordinate role, compared with some 
alleged right against coercion, in the name of autonomy.131
These goods are similar to Rawls's primary goods. They grant an environment or society 
which opens up acceptable life options. In contrast to these goods, anything which 
decreases autonomy should be rooted out. Raz does not support freedoms which are not 
conducive to the autonomy of citizens:  
Providing, preserving or protecting bad options does not enable one to enjoy 
valuable autonomy. This may sound very rigoristic and paternalistic. It conjures 
images of the state playing big brother forcing or manipulating people to do what 
it considers good for them against their will. Nothing could be further from the 
truth.132
The solution is a perfectionist one, but Raz is quick to assuage worries of paternalism. 
Simply put, the state positively acts towards a single delineated good through which other 
goods are implied or achieved. Raz does not ignore negative freedom: “In judging the 
value of negative freedom one should never forget that it derives from its contribution to 
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autonomy.”133  Negative freedom is not important for its own sake, but rather for the 
positive sake of supporting autonomy.  Raz reiterates that negative freedom “is valuable 
inasmuch as it serves positive freedom and autonomy.”134 Negative freedom exists in 
Raz's system, but serves in a subsidiary role. Positive freedom, instead, is the primary 
scheme through which authority expands autonomy. 
 With all the pieces in place, Raz presents the doctrine of liberty. It has 3 features: 
1) it positively demarcates a free and autonomous life; 2) it includes a state that must not 
merely protect freedom, but actively promote it and extend it as the morality of autonomy 
demands; and 3) it does not permit goals which infringe on autonomy unless they are 
justified to “protect or promote” the autonomy of others.135 The doctrine of freedom is a 
liberal system which promotes political freedom through the enforcement of moral 
autonomy. Raz is not frivolous with his choice of the word 'doctrine' to emphasize its 
positive character. Prima facie liberal rights and duties stem from the doctrine of liberty. 
The duty of toleration is an example of this: “The duty of toleration and the wider 
doctrine of freedom of which it is a part, are an aspect of the duty of respect for 
autonomy.”136  The doctrine of liberty responds to the intolerance that might come from 
pluralism by positively asserting a political duty to tolerate derived from the moral duty 
for autonomy.
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5.2 An Outline of Quong's Negative Freedom Oriented Liberalism 
Quong makes several arguments against Raz and in support of a modified version 
of Rawls's political liberalism. Quong advocates for a liberal system with broadly 
negative policies, in some respects more negative than Rawls's system. To be clear, 
Quong's liberalism is not libertarian, but rather a more precisely negative version of 
Rawls's. Quong is skilled in clearly laying out the most important questions of the 
positive-negative liberalism debate. Through this he is able to bring the reader to 
definitive crossroads, to then guide them on the correct path towards liberalism; a path 
which avoids the pitfalls and dead ends of perfectionism. The structure of his argument 
involves laying out the most essential questions of the debate, refuting positive 
conceptions of liberalism, and then clarifying or modifying Rawls's stance137 in favor of 
political liberalism. Quong sees Raz's perfectionism as inconsistent with liberalism 
because it makes paternalistic value judgments, judgments which are fundamentally 
disrespectful to citizens. He advocates for a negative type of liberalism that is internal to 
a people that are superficially reasonable and respectful, and thus broadly committed to 
liberal principles that need not move past the political level. 
Before getting into the thick of the debate, Quong stabilizes it with two questions 
that divide different forms of liberalism. These two questions illuminate what someone 
considers to be liberalism's relationship with morality, or in other words what the 
relationship is between the right and the good. The two questions are as follows: 
1. Must liberal political philosophy be based in some particular ideal of what 
constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs?  
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2. Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some activities, 
ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on 
the basis of other metaphysical claims?138
Question (1) asks if a comprehensive doctrine should be the foundation of liberalism, and 
(2) asks if the state can act on it. A 'yes' to (1) indicates a commitment to 
comprehensiveness, and a 'yes' to (2) indicates a commitment to perfectionism. 
Liberalism, as Quong sees it, can thus be divided into 4 camps:  
 Comprehensive Political 










Table 1, “Varieties of liberalism”139
Raz would, of course, answer 'yes' to both (1) and (2). Quong's answer, and what he takes 
to be Rawls's answer, is 'no' to both, making his stance to be political liberalism. 
According to the varieties of liberalism, it is the opposite of comprehensive 
perfectionism. The first task then becomes to show that comprehensive perfectionism 
cannot be the case. 
 Quong objects to Raz’s position for autonomy in a couple of ways. The first are a 
series of arguments that reject perfectionism on the grounds that it is illiberal in its 
disrespect towards citizens. The second moves against Raz's normal justification thesis in 
favor of a modified version. In the first, Quong rejects autonomy as a surefire 
comprehensive value or as a means to promote perfectionism. Autonomy could be a 
political value that is reinforced by the comprehensive views of individuals, but it could 
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go no further. He thinks that even if autonomy could permit perfectionist control, it 
would not result in an illiberal society. Quong's bottom line is this: “The value of 
autonomy can thus deliver a principled commitment to liberal toleration, or it can deliver 
perfectionism, but I doubt there is a coherent conception of autonomy that can deliver 
both.”140 Quong is adamant that Raz cannot have it both ways when it comes to 
autonomy. Even if autonomy could support perfectionism, the result is paternalism, not 
liberalism. Paternalism is different than liberalism because it violates liberalism's 
commitment to respect the individual. As Quong puts it, paternalism is “a very 
unappealing bullet for a liberal to bite.”141 He uses a simple example of finding a job. It is 
intuitively unacceptable for the liberal state to impose a job of threshing if a person does 
not want it themselves. This threshing job for this individual might lead to wonderful 
fulfillment, a high salary, a benefit for others, a home in a great community, etc., but 
none if these reasons matter if his desire is not there. Paternalism is objectionable if it 
operates on “a negative judgement about the paternalizee’s capacity to effectively 
advance his or her own interests.”142  This objection is not limited to overt coercion, it 
also extends to subtle influence. Quong elaborates: 
Perfectionist state policies, on the other hand, even when they avoid direct 
coercion and merely attempt to influence behavior through taxation and subsidies, 
treat citizens as if they lack the ability to make effective choices about their own 
lives. Such policies treat adults as children, not as free and equal citizens, and 
furthermore, they do so without treating each individual case on its own merits.143
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Paternalistic policies are disrespectful and even if with good intentions cannot be 
implemented in a way that considers the individual. The contradictions that arise when 
mixing moral autonomy, perfectionism, and liberalism is a deal-breaker for Quong: “The 
liberal state cannot consistently accord citizens the moral status of responsible agents, 
and yet also claim the moral right to direct the lives of citizens in ways that cannot be 
justified to them.”144 Autonomy can lead to liberalism, but not perfectionism, but even if 
it could justify paternal policies, the schema ceases to be liberal. 
 The second way Quong rejects Raz is by modifying his normal justification thesis 
(NJT) into a justice based one. Quong suggests the duty-based conception of legitimate 
authority instead:  
One way to establish that a person has legitimate authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to fulfil the duties of 
justice he is under if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to directly 
fulfil the duties he is under himself.145
What Quong's conception of authority does is replace Raz's 'reasons from autonomy' with 
'duties to justice'. It retains the advantage of avoiding popular consent or utility while 
enforcing justice instead of autonomy. Authority comes in support of justice in a 
Rawlsian way, that is political justice that any reasonable citizen would agree to. Quong 
concludes that “[. . .] political legitimacy is grounded in the natural duty of justice, and 
not general claims about what we should do or how we should live.”146 The emphasis on 
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justice means that authority would not get caught up in securing reasons which might run 
contrary to liberal principles. Since Raz's authority might lead to paternalist violations to 
liberalism, Quong modifies it into a justice enforcing authority. 
 After rejecting Raz, Quong turns to a set of arguments which promote his 
understanding of political liberalism. One of the most basic ones is that the liberal debate 
must be internal to those already committed to liberalism. An external conception of 
liberalism is one in which liberalism is a response to comprehensive disagreements being 
a fact of the world. The external conception views liberalism as a sweeping moral 
response to clashing comprehensive views of the good life. The internal conception 
assumes a preexisting liberal society that fosters pluralism which then seeks to identify its 
own exact justification, stability, and reasonability.147; Quong sees that liberalism must be 
viewed internally because it is most relevant to citizens in terms of their goals and 
relationship with the government.148 We are reasonable people, here and now, already 
committed to liberalism, and from here the theory begins. Quong identifies an issue a 
perfectionist might ask called 'the priority question': why should citizens look to mere 
public reason with regards to matters of justice rather than their comprehensive doctrine 
which transcends it?149 Quong responds that through the internal conception, there is a 
“moral motivation” or “concern with this public world” among citizens150 to respect other 
comprehensive doctrines on the political level. Congruence of comprehensive and 
political is not as necessary as it may seem. Public reason has not replaced individual 
doctrines, but rather runs as a result of the overlapping consensus of multiple doctrines, 
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compelling us to answer the priority question already from within. Quong's argument 
here is to better ground the debate surrounding political liberalism with an internal lens 
rather than an external one.  
 Finally, Quong’s own stance is that of Rawls’s political liberalism with two slight 
modifications: moving the overlapping consensus to entirely precede the realm of public 
reason, and widening the scope (and perhaps power) of public reason. Quong's first 
change is to the overlapping consensus. It is, in Rawls's view, a public reinforcement of 
liberalism through individual doctrines which occurs after the public sphere is cemented 
from the original position. Quong does thinks that the public sphere hardly needs such 
affirmation if it is already put in place, especially in sight of his justice-based authority. 
He writes: 
The overlapping consensus is not a test of actual acceptance that a free standing 
conception of justice must pass before it can be declared justified or legitimate. 
The overlapping consensus instead identifies what normative ideas citizens in 
ideal, well-ordered liberal society would share.151
What this means is that the overlapping consensus is the staging point from which all 
parties can even begin to talk in the first place. In a way, the overlapping consensus is a 
practical original position. The political debate can begin after the general principles are 
in rough view. 
 Quong's second departure from Rawls is in a wider scope of public reason.152;
Quong’s view is more flexible than Rawls’s in that it allows action from a legitimate 
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authority that is committed to justice even despite reasonable disagreements among 
citizens: 
[. . .] even when reasonable people disagree about the substance of justice, 
political decisions can still be legitimate if they appeal to political values that all 
reasonable persons can be expected to endorse. [. . .] a commitment to liberal 
neutrality need not also commit us to a narrow or libertarian view of legitimate 
state action. Many state actions can be legitimate, despite reasonable 
disagreement, as long as their rationales pass through the justificatory filter of 
reasonableness.153
A wider scope of public reason resonates with Quong's thoughts on legitimacy. Expected 
reasonableness is acceptable as far as the legitimate authority is concerned. Quong sees 
that public reason should be encouraged beyond political deliberation. It can be 
encouraged to grow in seemingly mundane or unrelated instances either for the sake of 
conflict resolution and communication, or because those instances might turn out to have 
political significance later.154 Widening the scope of reason does not stamp out 
comprehensive doctrines. Quong reminds us that comprehensive doctrines can still be 
introduced in debates when they are applicable and communicable. Whatever the case, 
Quong's system of liberalism expands public reason. 
5.3 Against Quong in Defense of Comprehensive Liberalism
The purpose of this section is to present my thoughts on the comprehensiveness of 
liberalism with some objections to both Quong and Raz. I reiterate: liberalism is 
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invariably comprehensive. It is impossible to disconnect liberalism with moral 
philosophy. I agree with Rawls's view155 that moral theory is somewhat insulated from 
other branches of philosophy. Moral theory does, however, tie in strongly with moral 
philosophy; and so, if liberalism is to invoke moral theory, it will invoke moral 
philosophy. Whether theoretical or philosophical, a view of 'the good life' or 'what is 
good for humans' cannot be said to be purely political. All forms of liberalism invariably 
invoke a moral presupposition, whether it be justice, autonomy, rationality, reasonability, 
or Lockean natural law. Though I do not think Raz’s autonomy based liberalism hits the 
perfect mark, I agree with his efforts. If a liberal theory is to advance beyond a libertarian 
modus vivendi, it will become morally thick.  
Even if a complete liberal theory could be successfully grounded on an ethically 
neutral foundation, it is intuitively contradictory as to how others would not consider it a 
moral theory. Liberalism properly conceived carries consequences to the human life on a 
macro scale. It might make neutral judgments towards many things, such as what color 
pants you will wear tomorrow, but that does not make these judgments any less moral. A 
judgment which states “you and everyone else are free to wear whatever color pants you 
choose tomorrow” is still philosophically charged. Perhaps there is an ethically neutral or 
empirical presupposition to liberal theory, but it will 'graduate' to morality as it asserts 
sweeping judgments on different benefits and burdens. The common form of liberalism 
must have something to it if it transforms a provisional agreement to a 'very great value'.  
Quong makes a critical distinction between ‘comprehensiveness’ and 
‘perfectionism’ that I have thus far set aside in my own overviews. To review, 
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perfectionism is the degree to which liberalism is compelled or permitted to positively act 
upon its comprehensiveness. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in any depth 
what this means for comprehensive liberalism. Quong makes a sketch that 
comprehensiveness in an authority would entail perfectionist action, but he also does not 
explore this thoroughly. Quong leaves the connection between comprehensiveness and 
perfectionism an open road other than that. For now I will provisionally accept the label 
that comprehensive liberalism is perfectionist, but I will not dive into the negative 
implications of it. Aside from this, I will follow Quong’s lead and put this topic aside for 
now in favor of just focusing on comprehensiveness. I will treat any further mention of 
perfectionism as synonymous with comprehensiveness for my current purposes. 
Raz's arguments are excellent in that they confirm that liberalism must be tied 
with morality, but I do not think that autonomy is the correct grounding moral principle. 
Quong's arguments against perfectionist policies in liberalism are extremely compelling, 
but he does not focus on discussing the comprehensiveness of liberalism. Returning to 
Raz, I object to his presumption of autonomy. Many well-ordered liberal societies hold 
deep incommensurate value towards security, virtue, or collective harmony just as much 
if not more than autonomy.156 Some others respect autonomy not as a moral presumption 
but as a resulting liberal value stemming from the fact of pluralism. It is not so clear to 
my why Raz chose the single plank of autonomy to support liberalism when there are an 
array of equally basic primary goods to choose from. I think Raz is on the right track. I do 
not wish to discuss his perfectionism so much here, but why 'autonomy' was chosen as 
the comprehensive assumption other than something like 'security' is confusing. Raz 
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agrees that comprehensive liberalism must rest on a moral foundation. What that 
foundation consists of exactly is beyond my scope here. For now, I can only imagine that 
a comprehensive underpinning would be a robust set of prima facie moral principles, not 
just a single principle such as Raz’s ‘autonomy’. 
Quong's arguments against perfectionism in liberalism are very strong, but one 
carries an implication on comprehensiveness to which I must object. Quong argues that 
comprehensiveness is not acceptable because changes in other branches of philosophy 
will morph or shake up liberalism.157 Political liberalism has the advantage of 
independence from drastic developments in other branches of philosophy. I do not 
understand why liberalism's philosophical independence is so valuable. Why must 
liberalism fear philosophical developments? If developments in moral philosophy or even 
biological science convinces us of something like “confining a person to a sense 
deprivation chamber is torture”, how could liberalism, or the values of reason, justice, or 
autonomy upon which it is founded on, ignore it? The resulting ‘first look’ convictions
shared by liberals of whatever type, even the thinnest ones, paint a picture of human 
flourishing which must be considered comprehensive moral principles if they are: derived 
from other moral assumptions, built through the natural attitudes and interpersonal 
dynamics of humanity, in agreement of an authority which can enforce them (even mere 
political duties, even on an international scale), reflected in overlapping consensus of 
other doctrines, or used as a staging point to ground debates internal to liberalism. Why 
should we fear the stability of liberalism when it must be tied to morality? Liberalism is 
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so entwined with moral philosophy, and so philosophically rigorous in its development 
and conclusions, that it is not sensible to fear for its independence. 
Here I present my main thrust against Quong, and transitively to any political 
liberalism: Political liberalism cannot have liberalism both ways like Rawls tried. It 
cannot assume its commitment to even minimally liberal principles and yet deny its 
comprehensiveness. Quong might insist that he is not committed to truth, metaphysics, 
comprehensive doctrines, perfectionism, or the good. His support for assumptions such as 
the fact of pluralism, reasonable political principles, or duty to justice says otherwise. If 
political liberalism were truly independent of any moral foundation it would turn into a 
Nozickian libertarianism which Quong agrees is “not even in the family of reasonable 
liberal conceptions.”158 Quong wants to remain internal and political, but how can 
liberalism be enforced upon unreasonable or illiberal people anymore if it does not 
address a fact of the world? He responds that a duty to justice is the way in which an 
authority can compel any citizen who at least has a “capacity” of reasonability.159 In that 
case, how are justice and reasonability not pushed to the brink of comprehensiveness if 
they are the source of authority without the violator's consent? I maintain against Quong 
once more that liberal theory cannot be a superficial one.
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Conclusion
A committed liberal theory such as Quong’s would invariably morph back into a 
comprehensive doctrine, and thus the paradox of positive liberalism rears its ugly head 
once more. Raz is privy to this reoccurring puzzle: “The perception of freedom as 
constituted by the ideals of personal autonomy and value-pluralism is familiar and used 
to be very popular.”160 The question of positive freedom based on comprehensive 
doctrines is tired. I am reminded of the debate between British idealists such as T. H. 
Green and other liberals like J. S. Mill. This paradox is complicated, and the exploration 
is far from over. The golden apple remains elusive, but there is a strong intuition to say 
that liberalism, even minimally conceived, must somehow be considered a comprehensive 
view of the good life. Responding 'no' to Quong’s (1) and (2) simply does not make room 
for morality. I do not think anything makes this clearer than Quong's treatment of Nazis. 
Quong agrees to suppress a Nazi planned march or a communism suppression rally. He 
argues that this is acceptable as both a defense of liberalism and as a bureaucratic, 
procedural output of the liberal state.161 If he agrees to coercing Nazis on such grounds, 
he must agree to deep philosophical convictions. These deep convictions may arise from 
the overlapping consensus or a conviction of liberalism. Wherever they do come from, 
they exist and they plainly manifest themselves in political action. Quong agrees with 
Burton Dreben: “Sometimes I am asked, when I go around speaking for Rawls, What do 
you say to an Adolf Hitler? The answer is [nothing]. You shoot him.”162 It is confusing 
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that he agrees to such an intense and morally strong act based on the justification of a 
moral vacuum. 
Augustine, Raz, and the fact of history demonstrate dangers and pitfalls in seeking 
comprehensive liberalism. I think a greater danger, on the other hand, would be a self-
defeating political liberalism that is so thin that it dissolves any moral, epistemological, 
or otherwise philosophical truths. My vision of a successful, thick, contemporary 
liberalism is one more humble and political than perfectionist liberals might hope, while 
also morally thicker than political liberals might like. I am optimistic that comprehensive 
liberalism can manifest and draw strength from both sides of the debate. A 
comprehensive conception of liberalism might seem paradoxical, but I think this 
confusion can be explained: liberalism first manifests itself under non-ideal 
circumstances, then it gains philosophical and legitimizing traction as a comprehensive 
idea. In the end, I simply wish to orient contemporary efforts away from political 
liberalism and towards comprehensive liberalism. The fact of history is a historic 
warning, but history also shows that liberalism is embracing comprehensiveness in 
practice. Philosophically speaking, Augustine shows that comprehensive liberalism can 
fail humanity, but Locke gives hope that it is possible for it to succeed. Rawls sought to 
move away from comprehensive liberalism to political liberalism, but his shift cannot 
help but slip back to thick philosophical justifications. This clash is present in the 
contemporary debate between Quong and Raz where neither is winning decisively, but 
both steer intuitions toward a properly grounded liberalism.  
I understand why proponents of political liberalism might see that their 
conception is not only the most cogent, but also the most capable of upholding 
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liberalism’s mantle in the world. Political liberalism can deftly sidestep or absorb major 
controversies and orient all decent parties towards peace as a practical objective. 
Comprehensive liberalism might be a growing historical trend, but is it worth sustaining? 
Can we support it if democracies across the world are more and more likely come into 
conflict with non-democracies? Even if not, any political liberal that digs deep into their 
own conception will uncover baseline assumptions and expectations. When political 
liberalism is stressed and bent, its surface façade falls away to reveal a philosophical 
core. Rawls himself is not sure why he shifted his conception of liberalism to emphasize 
its political and freestanding aspects: “I don’t think I really know why I took the course I 
did. Any story I would tell is likely to be fiction, merely what I want to believe.”163 I 
surmise Rawls took the course he did for the practical sake of saving liberalism from 
itself. If liberalism is thinning itself philosophically out for its practical survival, anyone 
concerned with its truth is confronted with a serious dilemma. My grave speculation here 
can only increase the demands on comprehensive liberalism. If political philosophy is 
given the charge of presenting comprehensive liberalism in a sound and convincing way, 
wherein lies its best hope? I have shown that Locke and Raz offer helpful conceptions of 
comprehensive liberalism, but they do not entirely convince me. For now, I can only 
suppose that we should start again with Rawls’s earlier works. 
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